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Much more Korean media content is now circulating globally as streaming services allow
easier access to various films and shows. In this climate, it seems pertinent to ask what makes a
film or TV show marked “Korean” on Netflix inherently Korean. The popular TV show is not
fully depicting Korea but representing an exaggerated and aesthetically warped portion. So what
makes the show Korean? Such questions are not new, especially for Korean films. A close look
at Korean film history indicates that the country’s film industry was particularly preoccupied
with the idea of a Korean national identity, especially under Japanese colonialism (1910-1945).
In this dissertation, I examine films that portray masculinity as a national myth, including
popular blockbusters or films set in modern Korea that have been excluded from or ignored in
previous discussions of national cinema that focused on historical content. I argue that Korean
national cinema depends upon the myth of masculinity; to be a Korean national film, a film must
engage with this myth.
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What makes Korean films Korean?
Nations are communities created not simply by forging certain bonds but by fracturing or
disallowing others; not merely by invoking and remembering certain versions of the past, but
making sure that others are forgotten or repressed.
Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism
Korean content flooded the market after director Bong Joon-ho’s Parasite won various
international film festival awards in 2020. The Netflix series Squid Game created by Hwang
Dong-hyuk in September 2021 resulted in a real-life competition in Manhattan on October 26 of
that year with some of the games seen on the series. Participants from various countries imitated
the characters in the popular TV show and played the traditional Korean kids’ games to win a
round-trip to Korea. The winner of the event, Charles from Queens, stated that he “can’t wait to
go to Korea and be immersed in its cultural heritage.”1
Much more Korean media content is now circulating globally as streaming services allow
easier access to various films and shows. In this climate, it seems pertinent to ask what makes a
film or TV show marked “Korean” on Netflix inherently Korean. When Charles from Queens
cannot wait to immerse himself in Korean culture, is he aware that he will not see young children
playing the games from Squid Game because everyone is busy on their smartphones and tablets?
The popular TV show is not fully depicting Korea but representing an exaggerated and
aesthetically warped portion. So what makes the show Korean? Such questions are not new,
especially for Korean films. A close look at Korean film history indicates that the country’s film
industry was particularly preoccupied with the idea of a Korean national identity, especially
under Japanese colonialism (1910-1945).
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Jae-Dong Yu, “New Yorkers Play Squid Game,” The Dong-a Ilbo, dongA, October 28, 2021,
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20211028/3012499/1.
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The historical context of imperialism and colonialism shapes a national understanding of
modern Korea. While many postcolonial texts focus on modern European colonialism, whose
colonies and ex-colonies covered 84.6% of the world by 1930s, as the most prevalent and
extensive form of colonialism, it is important to remember that colonialism exists in various
places and forms outside Europe.2 Korean postcolonial identity is even more complicated by the
presence of U.S. military rule (1945-8) that followed Japanese colonialism (1910-1945). While
the Japanese Other represented a significant villain, the U.S. that followed suit symbolized both
the powerful Other and an ally against the Japanese, the North Koreans, and the Russians. Korea,
along with many other postcolonial nations, is simultaneously postcolonial (formally or legally
independent from its colonizer) and neo-colonial in its economic or cultural dependence.3
Discussing a national identity after colonialism is further complicated by the
romanticized notion of a non-existent “pure” self of the past. Frantz Fanon argues that the way to
regain dignity for the colonized Black man is to accept one’s multiplicities and contradictions.
Thus, it is important to base my work of Korean postcolonial cinema on the multiplicities and
contradictions of the colonized, because the urge to detract and demonize the colonizer,
Japanese, is apparent in Korean films as well. In fact, the tendency to divide between the
colonizer and the colonized creates the myth of masculinity where a justifiable force is necessary
to eradicate the villain.4
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Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3.
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 12.
4
Other postcolonial scholars such as Homi K. Bhabha agree that there is no “pure” form of the colonized
self completely void of influences from the colonizers. Bhabha further theorizes that the act of integrating
colonizer’s culture into the postcolonial self is an act of empowerment. He observes colonized people mimic the
colonizer’s structural and cultural foundations in the postcolonial state and argues that the mimicry makes the
colonizers question their own assumed superiority to the colonized. Colonialism is destabilized through this active
mimicry. Such mimicry of infrastructure is evident in many postcolonial countries, including Korea. However, it is
interesting to note that credit is given more to “westernization” and general modernization efforts. In Korean history,
the West (specifically the U.S.) enter as a symbol of modernization as well as an antithesis of Japan.
3
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Furthermore, Fanon observes how African nations glorified precolonial culture in
response to the continued refusal on the colonizers’ part to recognize African history as
legitimate and valuable. While understanding this impulse to identify with a precolonial past as a
new postcolonial identity, Fanon ultimately sees this as problematic because it regards culture as
static and unchanging while reinforcing the arbitrary binary between the “civilized” and the
“primitive.”5 The romanticization of precolonial culture aims to restore postcolonial Africa to a
non-existent “original” or “authentic” self, and such glamorizing of the past disregards the
changing politics in postcolonial contexts. Fanon believes that a national consciousness in the
postcolonial nation should recognize both precolonial and colonial histories to account for the
lived experiences of the colonized – he is specifically talking about the colonized who have
internalized the colonizer’s view of the “primitive.”6 It is important to note that any simple
binary opposition between the colonizers and the colonized is an over-generalization, yet an
inherent part of colonial discourse. Otherization in colonialism is often based on an assumed
“primitivism” or a lack of “civilization.”7 Racial differences in certain European colonies had
functioned as an important signifier of difference, but in the Korean experience it is the lack of
racial difference that further complicates the already nebulous line between the colonizer and the
colonized.8
The binary between the colonizer and the colonized does not allow the postcolonial
nation to observe itself as an amalgamation of influences – there is no precolonial self that
negates all influences of the colonizer. Fanon identifies the wrong assumption in the strict
dichotomy between the colonizer and the colonized by arguing that binary-oriented thinking

5

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 66.
Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, 126-128.
7
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 91.
8
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 95.
6
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leads to two equally problematic self-identities for postcolonial Blacks. He writes that in an
attempt to regain dignity after being colonized, the Black person either emulates the white
colonizer or turns to a mystical prehistoric past.9 Both resolutions are an internalization of
colonialism in Fanon’s eyes because the colonized self exists only in relation to the colonizer.10
Fanon emphasizes how the ideal educated and “westernized” Black man is just as much an
invention of the colonizers as is the cannibalistic and primitive Black man.
In addition to Fanon’s binary, an additional problem with romanticizing a notion of static
tradition as a new identity is that it provides a national identity that ignores multiplicities of and
conflicts between different groups. Loomba identifies Gayatri Spivak’s understanding of a precolonial as always influenced by the history of colonialism, and that a pristine form of it that
exists separated from the history of colonialism does not exist.11 Such “untainted” understanding
of history prior to colonialism is further complicated by the wrongful assumption that all the
colonized were oppressed to an equal extent. The reality is much more complex as the ruling
class achieve domination not by force or coercion alone, but also by creating subjects who
“‘willingly’ submit to being ruled.”12
For example, Spivak discusses “sati” or widow burning and the British response to this
custom — “sati” is allowed only if the widow consents. Spivak asks the loaded question: under
the new British law, when the widow agrees to be burnt with her husband, is she choosing out of
her own desire or is she bound by a misogynistic set of expectations? In other words, is it
possible for the widow to have her own desires of honoring a tradition that is inherently and
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Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, 16.
Fanon calls this internalization of colonialism “epidermalization” because his focus is on blackness in
addition to colonization. In my project, I will be focusing more on the dichotomy between colonizer and the
colonized to discuss Korea’s historical situation with the Japanese.
11
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 21.
12
Antonio Gramsci qtd. In Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 30.
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implicitly oppressing her? Spivak’s dilemma derives from the fact that the widow’s consent
serves those in power (the patriarch) more than serving the subaltern, but it is also not right (for
the British) to simply assume that the widow is incapable of making her own decisions. “Sati” is
a precolonial tradition that is “untainted” by the British domination. However, the fact that the
tradition is based on the oppression of women is not questioned. Hindu nationalists and British
administrators all engaged in debates over the issue, but they were all working within a
conceptual order that saw women’s burning as part of the Hindu tradition. More importantly,
Loomba points out that the debaters saw women as needing representation by men: “As a result,
women’s own voices could find no representation during the colonial debates on this subject.”13
In this way, colonial regimes gained consent from certain native groups while excluding others.14
As Loomba argues it is important to remember such hierarchy within the colonized. Not all the
colonized are treated equally.
Colonialism is often based on colonized women’s labor, both sexual and economic.15
Elizabeth Schmidt argues that African chiefs, headmen, and other older men of authority
colluded with the European colonizers to maintain some control and power. In her article,
Schmidt writes about the creation of “native reserves” that ensured women generated food crops
to subsidize male wages while the younger men entered the labor market away from home.16 At
the same time, African chiefs had access to wages that husbands sent to their wives which would
not have been available to them if the wives had not remained on the “native reserves” where the
chief resided.17
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Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 38.
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 32.
15
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 145.
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Elizabeth Schmidt “Patriarchy, Capitalism, and the Colonial State in Zimbabwe” Journal of Women in
Culture & Society 16, no. 4 (1991): 734.
17
Schmidt, “Patriarchy,” 735.
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Gender and race intertwine as women’s sexuality and reproductive potential posed a
threat to the understanding of race as a mark of distinction for both the colonizers and the
colonized:
The fear of cultural and racial pollution prompts the most hysterical dogmas about racial
difference and sexual behaviours because it suggests the instability of ‘race’ as a
category. Sexuality is thus a means for the maintenance or erosion of racial difference.
Women on both sides of the colonial divide demarcate both the innermost sanctums of
race, culture and nation, as well as the porous frontiers through which these are
penetrated. Their relationship to colonial discourses is mediated through this double
positioning.18
Such double positioning leads to intense patriarchal oppression in postcolonial countries. The
home becomes a metaphor for the nation, and the woman in the domestic sphere symbolizes
cultural purity away from the influence of colonizers.19 Thus, machismo has been manifest in
many nationalist movements.20
To control such a threat to both the colonizer and the colonized, shame and obligation are
often used against colonized women. Carol Summers argues in her article that British colonizers
in Uganda blamed women’s sexual behavior for the syphilis outbreak as well as low birthrates in
early 1900s.21 Women were coerced to go through extremely painful treatments such as
intramuscular injection of mercury.22 The slogan “Make nurturers of these savage mothers”
represented the image of African women as less than fully human, and such sentiment was
reflected in the compulsory examination and treatment programs led by male doctors and
assistants.23 Similarly, Schmidt writes that missionaries and colonial blamed women in
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Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 135.
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 142.
20
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 139.
21
Carol Summers “Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda, 1907-1925”
Journal of Women in Culture & Society 16, no. 4 (1991): 789.
22
Summers, “Intimate Colonialism,” 791.
23
Summers, “Intimate Colonialism,” 800-801.
19

6

Zimbabwe as the source of depravity in African society.24 Native Department officials went as
far as to say that “young, able-bodied men were being enticed to stay home to satisfy female
sexual desires rather than going to work for the Europeans.”25
Returning to the idea of a postcolonial national identity, a national identity is not a simple
resistance against colonialism because experiences of and responses to colonialism are varied
and fragmented. In addition, nation-based identity is not completely detached from gender, class,
or region-based identities within the nation. Yet the national identity appears unified and
dominates other forms of identities because national identity is supposedly based on a “common”
national trauma of colonialism. Domination is a recorded historical fact, and such trauma
becomes the foundation for a unified national identity – the myth of masculinity. And postliberation Korean films reflect this myth – a masculinity that promotes men’s subjective
experience as complete and thorough. This embedded and underlying myth functions as a
national identity and a cultural marker in modern Korea.
More so than an image or representation, the myth functions as a national identity for
post-colonial Korea. The myth, as a system of communication, is widespread yet discrete. It is
harder to question the problems of the myth of masculinity because the myth itself is elusive yet
prevalent. The myth of masculinity is embedded in various forms of media, cultural artifacts, and
more. There is no erasing of the historical fact that Korea had been dominated, but the myth
provides a narrative of an unbending Korean spirit that had overcome colonialism and will never
be dominated by an outsider ever again. In this way, the myth helps form a collective national
identity in postcolonial Korea.

24
25

Schmidt, “Intimate Colonialism,” 737.
Schmidt, “Intimate Colonialism,” 737.
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The problem with the myth of masculinity is its collapse of national and gender (male)
identities into one. In doing so, masculinity disregards women’s experience of the colonial
trauma – the masculine acts on behalf of women. The myth of masculinity refers to an
exaggerated performance of masculinity with a focus on and legitimization of male violence. The
origin of the term derives from a 1988 study of male socialization by U.S. psychologists Donald
L. Mosher and Silvan S. Tomkins, who observed how masculine behavior is ranked superior to
feminine behavior within a group of male subjects. As Mosher and Tomkins note, “macho
ideology honors the ‘superior, masculine’ affects and humiliates the displayer of ‘inferior,
feminine’ affects. […] Not just a male, and not just masculine, the macho must be masculine in
ideology and action.”26 While machismo simultaneously emphasizes violence among men and
the sexualization of women, the myth of masculinity highlights male subjectivity and behavior
while neglecting feminine subjects. Women’s agency is denied as the myth of masculinity overemphasizes male experience and aftermath of colonialism while limiting women as objects to be
protected by the men. In this dissertation, I will analyze contemporary Korean films (1999-2017)
in order to examine the lasting impact of the myth of masculinity starting with Japanese
colonialism.
Some existing scholarship on national cinema already considers the correlation between
national cinema and identity. For Susan Hayward, cinema “affirms what it reflects, and is
affirmed by what it reflects.”27 Therefore, national cinema and the nation cannot be considered
separately because national cinema impacts and is impacted by the concept of the nation.
Building on Hayward’s definition and Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined communities,”

26

Donald L. Mosher and Silvan S. Tomkins, “Scripting the Macho Man: Hypermasculine Socialization and
Enculturation,” Journal of Sex Research 25, no. 1 (1988): 64.
27
Susan Hayward, French National Cinema 2 ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), x.
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Wimal Dissanayake discusses postcolonial national cinema and the formation of national identity
through a unifying myth and the recreation of “imagined communities” in the modern world.28
To study national cinema is thus to examine which myths the nation wants to perpetuate as well
as to observe what is excluded from this unified image of the nation. In this way, a national
cinema is defined by the national myths that it helps to create and perpetuate.
While most Korean films no longer feature Japanese colonialism directly, the lasting
effects of its domination resulted in the national myth of masculinity. This trauma is embedded
in the portrayal of Korean identity as male and aggressive. Masculinity is the dominant national
myth of Korea because it is a direct response to Japanese domination based on the pre-existing
prioritization of masculinity through Confucianism embedded in the culture since early Joseon
Dynasty. Similar to other post-colonial films, Korean films portray colonialism as a form of
dehumanization. However, due to the focus on male experience and identity, Korean cinema
centers around male experience of such dehumanization specifically in the form of emasculation.
Numerous works of scholarship on individual Korean directors and their contribution to
national cinema already exist. For example, the “Korean Film Directors” series by Seoul
Selection USA Publishing includes books on individual directors such as Lee Chang-dong, Jang
Sun-woo, Lee Myung-se, Kang Woo-suk, Bong Joon-ho, Yu Hyun-mok, Im Kwon-taek, Shin
Sang-ok, Ryoo Seung-wan, Kim Jee-woon, Im Sang-soo, and others. But even when some
volumes are dedicated to an overview of Korean cinema, the chapters focus on individual or
“major” directors.29 While research on individual directors is valuable, it does not provide an
overarching view of Korean cinema, especially both domestically and internationally.

28

Wimal Dissanayake, Colonialism & Nationalism in Asian Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1994), x.
29
One of many examples would be Sovereign Violence: Ethics and South Korean Cinema in the New
Millennium edited by Steve Choe.
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Furthermore, the focus on predominantly male directors fails to consider how national identity
interacts with gender in postcolonial Korean society.30
Other works begin to interrogate the relationship between gender and national identity,
but with emphasis on male subjectivity. For example, Kyung Hyun Kim examines new Korean
cinema and its inherent longing for the rebirth of a strong male subject in The Remasculinization
of Korean Cinema (2004). While the book entails a critical reading of evolving male
subjectivities through films, it does not extend its analysis to female subjectivities. While Kim
reads the Korean War and continuing legacy of colonialism as factors that “wrecked and
disordered” male subjectivity, his discussion of such national trauma neglects to examine its
impact on women.31 More importantly, Kim’s scholarship does not problematize the “inherent
longing” for the rebirth of a stronger male subject. In fact, at times the author justifies the
movement. The focus on male subjectivities in both films and existing scholarship indicates the
underlying influence of the myth of masculinity that prioritizes the male experiences of trauma
and postcolonial survival.
In this dissertation, I examine films that portray masculinity as a national myth, including
popular blockbusters or films set in modern Korea that have been excluded from or ignored in
previous discussions of national cinema that focused on historical content. I argue that Korean
national cinema depends upon the myth of masculinity; to be a Korean national film, a film must
engage with this myth.
Chapter 1 explores national myth and trauma through a brief historical overview of
Korean cinema. This chapter focuses on the interrelationship between the trauma of colonization

30

There is one book in the aforementioned “Korean Film Directors” series dedicated to a female film
director, Lim Soon-rye.
31
Kyung Hyun Kim, The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004),
11-12.
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and the myth of masculinity seen through early Korean cinema. The films in chapter cover the
early silent films and post-colonial minjok films. Chapter 2 examines the correlation between
1997 Asian financial crisis and the perception of the myth of masculinity. I argue that the
economic crisis fundamentally reshapes the myth of masculinity to celebrate a masculine that is
more communicative and caring rather than all-knowing and authoritarian. The films I discuss in
this chapter are transitional films during the Asian financial crisis including Peppermint Candy
(Dir. Lee Chang-dong, 1999) and Happy End (Dir. Jung Ji-woo, 1999). Chapter 3 focuses on a
more recent national trauma of Sewol ferry incident in relation to the film Train to Busan (2016),
the first Korean zombie film that was released in theaters outside Korea. I elaborate on the
Koreanness and melodramatic narration in the film. In Chapter 4, I examine what is excluded
from the national identity when masculinity is presented as a unifying national myth of Korea,
namely, women’s subjective experience of trauma.
The first chapter provides a historical overview of Korean cinema, inevitably related to
the national trauma of Japanese colonialism. Here, I outline the connection between national
myth and national trauma in Korean films, beginning with Na Woon-gyu’s Arirang (1926), the
first film to be identified as minjok film, which triggered a sense of ethnic identity for Koreans
when the country no longer existed.
The first attempt at a national cinema that celebrates the Korean identity contrasted
against the Japanese is minjok film. Tae-geun An defines minjok films as films that can only be
truly understood by Koreans. A minjok film not only tells the story of Koreans but is also
produced by Koreans. In 100 Years of Korean Film History, An argues that early films in Korea
started out as a direct response against oppressive Japanese colonial rule, which influenced the
way art forms were primarily perceived as cultural products. Cultural expression became a way
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to rebel against assimilation, functioning as a repository for the oppressed Korean identity. Taegeun An calls Na’s Arirang the first minjok film, a film that not only appears ethnic but also
captures the spirit of Koreans.32
In the chapter I also address Kim Ki-duk’s Arirang (2011) and analyze how Kim
appropriates the masculine myth in his personal narrative. This autobiographical film centers
around Kim’s traumatic experience with his earlier film Dream (2008). During filming, the lead
actress is nearly strangled to death while participating in a hanging scene that Kim demanded.
The film portrays the experience as a trauma to Kim as an artist. Because Kim sees himself as an
indispensable global artist that contributes to Korean culture, he correlates his personal trauma to
the national one by naming his film Arirang. The documentary Arirang (2011) won an award for
best film in Un Certain Regard category from the Cannes Film Festival. Masculinity is so closely
embedded in Korean films that a celebrated male director like Kim is ultimately unable to
recognize his own appropriation of national trauma.
Chapter Two focuses on the financially or socially powerless patriarchs in the early
2000s due to the Asian financial crisis and the “IMF Crisis” in Korea. Unlike in the beginning of
the film history in Korea, now we see unemployed fathers, alcoholic fathers, and fathers who had
been cheated on by their wives. These patriarchs have failed to protect their family, and their
violence is not justified. Unlike earlier films, Korean films in the 2000s feature fathers who are
no longer capable of heading the unit of family. With the Asian financial crisis masculinity
rebrands itself to separate from the now-criticized authoritative patriarch.
Films prior to the financial crisis depict heroes as strong father figures who see the big
picture and lead his family to prosperity. When the economy crashed, however, all economic

32

Tae-geun An, 100 Years of Korean Film History, (Seoul: Book Story, 2013), 26.
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growth came to an end. Unemployment skyrocketed and the long-repressed critique of the
modernizers began to flow freely. The all-knowing and authoritative fathers were suddenly
thrown into helplessness. This is the point in which the myth of masculinity separates itself from
authoritative patriarchy—films after the financial crisis features authoritative and stubborn
patriarchs as villains, and their violence is no longer justified. All-knowing patriarchs are no
longer the masculine heroes.
The third chapter focuses on the film Train to Busan (Dir. Yeon Sang-ho, 2016). Train to
Busan critiques the lack of community within modern Korea and provides a vision of a world
once again dominated by a threatening Other, the zombies. Here we see a new masculinity – a
father that is caring and willing to listen. The new masculine is no longer an all-knowing
authoritarian but one that is gentle, kind, and uses violence to protect all that are socially weak.
The main character in the film must step up to protect a pregnant woman and his young daughter
to ensure a good future for Korea. Although the father dies at the end, it is only after he delivers
the woman and his daughter to safety. Masculinity is seen as playing a vital role in ensuring the
continued future of Korea. It is also important to mention that Train is a response to both the
historical trauma of domination and the more recent trauma of Sewol ferry sinking incident. In
April 2014, a ferry called Sewol carrying mostly high school students on a school trip sank. With
proper procedures, everyone on board could have been rescued, but the combination of the
irresponsible captain and crew with untrained marine police resulted in 294 deaths. The film sees
a masculine leader as the solution to the tragedy and provides one in the film.
While the film is a call for action for domestic audiences, Train to Busan is also an
example of a globally successful Korean blockbuster. Korean blockbusters are a localized form
of Hollywood blockbuster with high production values and spectacle to generate the most profit.

13

Starting from the late 1990s, the government invested in the exportation of Korean films to
foreign buyers, focusing on reaching audiences in the U.S. This effort to export films is now
flourishing with global streaming services such as Netflix.
In chapter 4, I examine films that highlight the problems when the myth of masculinity is
accepted without critical inspection. In particular, I analyze the situations of comfort women, sex
slaves to Japanese soldiers during colonialism, and kijich’on sex workers who worked on U.S.
military camptowns. The two films I analyze in-depth are Spirits’ Homecoming (Dir. Cho Jungrae, 2016) and The Bacchus Lady (Dir. E J-yong, 2016).
I end the chapter with a discussion of an important moment for the myth of masculinity in
Korea: the 2012 election when Park Geun-hye became the first female president in Korea. She
was different from the former leaders who were referred to as “the nation’s father.” Her election
caused the media to emphasize how far Korea had come as a nation to be able to achieve gender
equality. What this self-congratulatory laud fails to acknowledge is Park Geun-hye’s status as the
daughter of the most famous military dictator, Park Chung-hee. Park Geun-hye’s political history
began in her early 20s when she supported her father after the assassination of the First Lady, her
mother, in 1974. Her image as a supportive and dutiful daughter is crucial to her victory as the
first female president. At the same time, her more “passive” image worked against her in her
impeachment as she became the first Korean president to be impeached in 2017.

Conclusion
Examining the myth of masculinity in recent Korean national films is crucial to
contextualizing these films. As scholars before me have argued, national cinema formulates and
instills a national self-identity. Although Japanese colonialism ended more than seventy years
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ago, it impacts Koreans as an open wound still triggering immediate responses of masculinity. I
hope to provide a broader definition of Korean national film than limiting national films to
historical and traditional content because doing so mistakenly assumes that only precolonial
history constitutes Korean culture. Current films do not exist separately from Korean identity and
values, even if their contents lack a clear national and historical Other.
Furthermore, when scholars limit the definition of Koreanness to historical content, it
leaves no room for discussions of the problems masculinity can cause in modern-day Korea. The
myth of masculinity perpetuated by national cinema privileges male subjectivity at the expense
of female subjectivity. By examining this exclusion of female subjectivity, I intend for this
project to provide a foundation for further studies on female representation in Korea.

15

Chapter 1 National Trauma, the Myth of Masculinity, and Arirang
Na Woon-Gyu’s Arirang opened in theaters in Japan-dominated Korea in 1926. The film
was a success financially, but more importantly, it reflected the desire for a national identity
distinct from that of the colonizer. The film made people think about what it means to be Korean
in a Japan-dominated Korea. Na Woon-Gyu claimed in an interview after the release and success
of Arirang that “Korea’s inherent spirit is masculine. A collective identity is fierce and
courageous, and I wanted to portray that vigor onscreen.”33
Film, similar to many other cultural artifacts, represents both how a nation is perceived
and how a nation wants to be perceived. The national identity portrayed by film appears unitary
and whole. In Korean films, the national identity inspired by the history of Japanese colonialism
(1910-1945) is masculine in that it defies domination and uses justifiable violence to defend the
self. The masculine national identity is focused on male experience of colonialism, and therefore,
leaves little room for female or non-traditional male experiences.
The focus on male subjectivities in postcolonial cultures is not unique to Korea. For
example, in Empire and Nation Partha Chatterjee identifies nationalism in postcolonial India as a
“feature of the victorious anticolonial struggles” that “creates its own domain of sovereignty
within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power.”34 In this
process, anticolonial nationalism recognizes two distinct spheres: the inner and the outer
domains. The outer domain is the material sphere “where the West had proved its superiority and
the East had succumbed” and the spiritual or the inner domain is where the nation strives to
“preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture.”35
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Chatterjee goes onto explain that the inner domain or what is considered “spiritual
culture” is strategically mystified to the extent that it becomes the “true self; it is that which is
genuinely essential.”36 The spiritual inner domain defended tradition and customs in its
glorification of India’s past.37 Home and family were crucial to the tradition as Chatterjee argues
that nationalism ideologically divided gender roles more strictly in postcolonial India.
“A new patriarchy that was brought into existence, different from the ‘traditional’ order
but also explicitly claiming to be different from the ‘Western’ family. The ‘new woman’
was to be modern, but she would also have to display the signs of national tradition and
therefore would be essentially different from the ‘Western’ woman.”38
The postcolonial new woman is modern but traditional – she is aware of modernization efforts
that impact infrastructure and systems in India. In fact, she is granted additional opportunities of
cultural refinement through education.39 Yet, her own values align with the traditional gender
expectations of a patriarchal family structure. She would be different from both men and
Western woman in her role as the protector and nurturer in the family, “quite the reverse of the
‘common’ woman who was coarse, vulgar, loud, quarrelsome, devoid of superior moral sense,
sexually promiscuous, subjected to brutal physical oppression by males.”40 The new woman is
culturally superior to westernized Indian women and western women who have become less
spiritual, less reserved, and less pure in their cultural identities. The new woman is crucial to the
postcolonial Indian identity because her expected role preserves what is thought to be inherently
Indian.41 “Indian nationalist discourse of the nineteenth century saw the necessity of fortifying
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the inner spirituality, which was the women's domain, against the colonizer who demonstrated
material superiority, the realm of which should have belonged to the Indian male.”42
Similar to postcolonial India, postcolonial Korean identity revolves around the home and
the family. This is particularly evident in national films that represent a family as a unified
whole. Korean postcolonial identity displaces women’s experience of trauma in its prioritization
of male experience. Korean masculinity, the postcolonial national identity, is re-masculinization
of the male that has been dominated, penetrated, and humiliated through colonialism. Women’s
experience of domination – especially that of comfort women who were taken by the Japanese
army to service men – is not a part of the new identity. Masculinity situates women as objects in
need of protection from plunder by the villainous Other. Post-liberation Korean films adapted the
trauma of colonization and created a unifying national myth of masculinity—a mythical gender
and national stability that focuses on men’s subjective experiences as representative of the
national trauma.
My research stems from unanswered questions of existing scholarship on Korean cinema
in relation to the representations of gender. While male subjectivities have changed throughout
the years in film representation, women’s representation is singular and limited. There are
multiplicities to masculine representations of humiliated men after colonization, protective and
authoritative patriarchs, and independent subjects. Men are seen threatened by colonizers, war,
financial difficulties, and rapid modernization – and although all the same traumas have existed
for women, their subjective experiences are often excluded. A lack of female directors can
partially explain such gender inequality in Korean cinema. The main reason I argue is the myth
of masculinity.
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A myth is a system of communication.43 Roland Barthes writes that a myth is not one
particular object but a form of communication that arises from a historical foundation.44 A myth
is not restricted to one method of communication, but can be expressed through writings, speech,
photography, cinema, reporting, sport, shows, publicity.45 It is an underlying message delivered
through various and diverse means to an audience who shares a historical foundation. The
historical foundation for the myth of masculinity in Korea is Japanese colonialism. The message
of the myth of masculinity is that Korean men are strong enough to protect their country and
family, that no outsider will dominate “us” again.
The problem arises because the concept of “us” in the myth is so preoccupied with the
male experience and humiliation of colonialism that women are objectified as “something to be
protected” or threat. There is no expression of women’s subjective experience of the domination.
Women are “doubly colonized by colonizers and by men of the same race. […] Colonized
Korean men not only deny feminine subjectivity but oppress Korean women, to shed their
emasculated and infantilized image and prove their masculinity to a degree of exaggeration that
may include violence against women.”46 Other postcolonial scholars also note the oppression
against colonized women. Ania Loomba writes that colonialism intensified patriarchal
oppression because men attempted to regain control that they lost in the public sphere within the
domestic realm.47 The myth, as a system of communication, is more widespread yet discrete. It is
harder to question the problems of the myth of masculinity because the myth itself is elusive yet
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prevalent. The myth of masculinity is embedded in various forms of media, cultural artifacts, and
more.
Postcolonial identity is inevitably related to colonialism and its impact. To imagine a selfidentity that exists without any influences of colonialism would be to misunderstand culture
altogether. At the same time, postcolonial identity is impacted by beliefs and structures that
existed before the domination. The myth of masculinity combines both pre-colonial and postcolonial male-centric understanding of trauma. Young Korean women who had been kidnapped
or tricked into providing sexual services to the Japanese military (referred to as “comfort
women”) were silenced in the postcolonial Korea, even in the “most fervent anti-colonial
nationalist narratives in Korea” until 1991 when three former comfort women sued the Japanese
government.48 However, this silencing of female experience of domination has existed before
Japanese colonialism. In mid-seventeenth century young Korean women were sent as gifts or
tributes to Qing Dynasty in China. When the women managed to escape or come home, they
were labeled as “homecoming women” and shunned by their families.49 They were often
encouraged to commit suicide to rid of their “tainted” bodies. The strict control of women’s
body, an ideology of chastity, and the fear of emasculation have combined to form the myth of
masculinity.
The myth of masculinity incorporates an often-exaggerated performance of masculinity
with a focus on and legitimization of male violence. Early study of masculinity has been
connected to the performance of a masculine identity in the absence of a male role model.50 This
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suggests that the subject needs to perform more masculinity to compensate for the missing
influence. In 1988 U.S. psychologists Donald L. Mosher and Silvan S. Tomkins conducted a
study of male socialization. They observed that masculine behavior is ranked superior to
feminine behavior within a group of male subjects.51
While masculinity has been generally theorized in psychological contexts, it provides an
ideal model for understanding postcolonial Korea; the myth of masculinity is the hegemonic
masculinity of South Korea. While the term “machismo” describes men’s relationship to women
as sexualized, the term “hegemonic masculinity” focuses more on different masculinities and
hierarchy formation than on how women are excluded from this study of masculinities.
“Hegemonic masculinity” is similar to the myth of masculinity because it also presents an ideal
model of masculinity of a specific time and culture to be the standard against which other
masculinities perform. “Hegemonic masculinity” also recognizes that it functions as a “pattern of
practice that allow[s] men’s dominance over women to continue” because of its valuing
masculine behavior over feminine ones in men.52
However, the term “hegemonic masculinity” does not focus on the heroic portrayal of the
ideal man and the infantilization of women, which is crucial to how Korean cinema portrays
postcolonial Korea. I am not only examining the dominance of one masculinity over others but
also how this particular dominant masculinity is justified and celebrated by becoming a national
myth. Postcolonial national identity portrayed by domestic media has to be a unifying one, a
myth that reinvents the national self through a reflection of historical trauma and contexts. In
postcolonial Korea, masculinity is the myth which creates the self-identity in relation to Japanese
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domination. The masculine self in Korean films is a patriotic, justifiably violent, honorable, and
protective man. At the other end of the spectrum is the Other that is unpatriotic, selfish, and
unnecessarily violent (rapists, plunderers). Portrayed as necessary and patriotic due to the
national trauma of colonization, the myth of masculinity suggests a unified national image of an
ideal man – a man that would not stand to be dominated by an outsider.

Film History in Korea
Film historians place the beginnings of western cinema at the end of the nineteenth
century with the Lumière brothers. In Korea, filmmaking began as a colonial practice during the
Japanese occupation (1910-1945). The fraught relationship between Korea and Japan starts long
before 1910. One of the earliest and most serious cases of tension is in the 1590s when a
Japanese general Toyotomi Hideyoshi slashed and burned through Korea multiple times in order
to invade China. Arable lands were destroyed, people murdered, and women violated by
Japanese, Chinese, and Korean troops in the chaos.53 China’s role is crucial in the Korea-Japan
conflict throughout the years as two Sino-Japanese Wars impacted Koreans directly and
indirectly.
In addition to its domination by the military, Korea also functioned as a market for
Japanese products including films. Japan was already involved in domestic film production by
the time of the 1910 annexation of Korea. By 1908, the first film studio was built in Tokyo for
Tsunekichi and others to start producing Japanese films. With the annexation of Korea in 1910,
more Japanese moved to the Korean peninsula, and some realized the economic and ideological
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potential of films. Japan’s export-based economy necessitated a uniquely identifiable Japanese
national identity, a model for film distribution that Korea later applied.
Although the focus was on exportation of Japanese films to Korea, the Japanese
government also saw the potential for film to displace anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea. As a
result, the Japanese Government-General of Korea financed the making of a film to encourage
saving money for Koreans. The Vow Made Below the Moon (Dir. Yoon Baek-Nam, 1923) is a
story of a well-educated youth who wastes his money on drinking and womanizing. When his
debt starts accruing, he gambles to make money. Addicted to gambling, he is beaten one night
for cheating, and is saved by his fiancé who nurses him back to health. His fiancé’s father pays
off his debt with the money he had saved over the years, and the young man learns the
importance of saving money. Heavy intervention from the Japanese government led to The Vow
eliding the real sufferings endured by the Koreans. Instead, it became a morality tale that warned
Korean youths to restrain from gambling and save the money instead.54
Overall, the Japanese government’s focus was on both the exportation of Japanese films
to Korea and the suppression of anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, rather than the development of
a singularly Korean film industry. Japan instilled multiple film policies to aid the importation
and consumption of Japanese films within Korea. One such policy was the “Motion Picture Film
Censorship Act” of 1926 that targeted against ideological or nationalistic content in Koreanproduced films.55 The “Motion Picture Film Censorship Act” of 1926 was in part a direct
response to Na Woon-gyu’s film Arirang (1926), a film that promoted a strong Korean identity
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that is distinct from and resistant against the Japanese. The regulation aimed to protect the
Japanese film industry as well as firmly establish Korea as a marketplace for Japanese films.56
Yet another example of a film policy is the 1939 “Korean Film Decree” that regulated the
production and distribution of Korean films that depicted Japanese presence in Korea as anything
but positive.
In opposition to Japanese cultural policies of 1930s and ‘40s that denied a distinct Korean
identity, Korean films functioned as a form of rebellion and an attempt to materialize and protect
a collective identity separate from the Japanese. Film directors refused to collaborate with the
Japanese and instead sought creative ways to circumvent the strict policies.
Na’s Arirang (1926) is significant in Korean film history because it was the first antiJapanese film designed to inspire a national identity that is different from the colonizer. It was a
film that spoke more personally to the Korean audience because there was a sentiment only
oppressed Koreans living in Japan-dominated Korea would sympathize with. Indeed, Korean
film historian Tae-geun An calls Na’s Arirang the first minjok film, a film that not only appears
ethnic but also captures the spirit of Koreans.57

Na Woon-Gyu and Minjok Films
The first movie production company in Korea, Chosun Kinema Corporation, was set up
in 1924 in Busan by the Japanese. Busan is a large port city about 200 miles south of the capital
city, Seoul. The city was chosen based on access; it was one of the three ports that opened up to
the Japanese since the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa. Chosun Kinema was funded by a group of
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wealthy Japanese composed of various professionals with little knowledge of film production.
Production crews and technicians were also recruited from Japan and they constantly clashed
with the Korean actors and ghost directors in the “Korean” films. Chosun Kinema closed after
two years but it played a crucial role in creating a network for Korean filmmakers including Na
Woon-Gyu.
Coming from an activist background, Na leaned towards militarism in his young age. He
joined the army for national independence because he believed Korea needed a strong military of
its own to decolonialize from Japan’s military colonial rule.58 After spending two years in prison
for activism, however, Na turned to education for a different way of liberating Korea. He sought
to contribute to the preservation of an inherent Koreanness at the same moment that Japan was
trying to assimilate Korea into Japan through cultural imperialism.
Na Woon-Gyu’s Arirang was the second film produced by Chosun Kinema. The film was
released in Danseongsa Theater in Seoul when theaters in Busan, under stricter rules of Japanese
investors, refused to show the film. The Japanese government initially allowed subtle cultural
anger to be expressed in early 1920s through Arirang because they didn’t expect it to connect
back to reality; they thought Koreans would watch Arirang, get angry, and then be satisfied with
the opportunity to get angry at a fictional world disjointed from reality. Arirang would have been
heavily censored if it were released during the later years of colonialism, and Na’s subsequent
films were all heavily cut to exclude any anti-Japanese insinuation.
Tae-geun An calls Na’s Arirang the first minjok film and a starting point of a coherent
Korean identity through film. The word minjok refers to a group of people who have lived in a
social community for a long time and share a language and a tradition. Minjok is also used
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outside cinematic contexts; for example, the phrase “one minjok” was used to describe an unicultural Korea for a long time. Yet the term does not always coincide with the boundaries of the
nation. Instead, it is closer to “ethnic” than “national.” This distinction was important to Koreans
during colonialism when they existed in a land that was no longer “Korea” but “Japan.” The
Korean land was no longer home but a stolen land, and as people co-existing in this now-foreign
land, Korean people were united in expressing sorrow through the film that spoke to “Koreans.”
Below, I have translated An’s definition of minjok films:
A minjok film not only appears ethnic but also captures the spirit of Koreans. It can be
seen as a film made by Koreans containing sensibilities only Koreans can feel. The
prerequisite for a minjok film is that it is a story about Korean people made by Koreans.
Anti-Japanese films exist as a pillar of minjok film. An anti-Japanese film contains the
rejection of the Japanese imperialism and its influence.59
A minjok film is an attempt to identify and maintain the self when the Other oppresses every
aspect of national identity including language. During the Japanese occupation, Korean schools
were closed, Korean language was restricted in schools and daily lives to varying degrees, and
everyone was given Japanese names. The attempts to change all Korean names to Japanese ones
around 1939 reversed the earlier decree in 1911 that forbade Koreans from taking Japanese
names in an attempt to distinguish between Koreans and Japanese.60 Unlike the early years of
colonialism, Japan designed new rules to incorporate Korea into Japan under the cultural
assimilation agenda during later colonialism. But “just as some politicians in Japan feared, the
Name Change Campaign was more effective in promoting nationalist consciousness than in
suppressing it.”61 The Korean language became a tangible symbol of Koreanness for many, and
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Na’s Arirang was popular for its usage of Korean language along with Korean director and
actors.
As a minjok film, Arirang not only appears ethnically Korean with actors and directors
from Korea, but also captures the very spirit of Koreans. So Young Kim, Haelin Baek, and Dae
Geun Lim identify Arirang as a minjok film that fuses bitterness with humor, and an antiJapanese spirit with a melodramatic storyline.62 Arirang emphasizes the anti-Japanese spirit as
necessarily Korean during Japanese colonialism. In other words, Na evokes a Korean identity
through resistance to Japan. The film made audiences laugh and cry with the characters, quickly
switching tones purposefully to depict the horrors of colonization but also satirizing it. This tonal
shift is detectable in many recent Korean films as well, becoming a part of Korean film-making
practice and a marker for narration in Korean films. Born of anti-colonial sentiment, Korean
films throughout history show the subconscious lasting impact of Japanese domination.
Arirang is now categorized as lost, as the original reel no longer remains intact. It was
said to be in the possession of a Japanese individual before the Korean War (1950-53), but none
of the original reel has been discovered. The plot of the film is available only through reviews
and Na’s remake of the original. Named after a folksong by the same title, Arirang is set in
Korea following the 1919 protest against Japanese occupation. The main character, Yeong-jin, is
an insane man who hallucinates and sings throughout the film. One day, a rich farmer’s son tries
to rape Yeong-jin’s sister. Yeong-jin kills him and is taken to prison.
The film cleverly sets up Yeong-jin as an insane character to express anti-Japanese
sentiments freely through his mouth. One example is his reoccurring hallucinations about a man
and a woman wandering the desert. The man is dressed in white, a color representing the good,
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in this film, Koreans. They encounter a rich merchant in black robes that symbolize evil,
representing the Japanese. The couple begs for some water. The merchant says he will give the
woman the water if she abandons the man for the merchant. The man lunges at the merchant, and
eventually kills the merchant.63 The madness and hallucination are used as a metaphor for
oppressed Koreans, and it implies that through strong resistance Koreans will defeat the evil
Japanese. It would be easy to interpret such message as a moment of solidarity, but to disregard
the implied prioritization of male subjectivity would be to over-simplify the intricate correlation
between nationalism and gender. The film still reflects masculine views on gender roles and
expectations as the man in white is responsible for both himself and the woman. Masculine
violence is justified because the rich merchant threatens to take the woman from the man in
white. To reiterate, masculinity is not violence against women but a justified violence against the
outsider who is trying to harm or take the women away from the masculine man. The woman
must be rescued from the merchant because she belongs with—and to—the man in white.
Another example of anti-Japanese sentiment in the film is the song “Arirang” that is
featured in the film eight different times.64 Since Arirang was a silent film, a narrator and a
singer accompanied every showing at the theater. The film was not complete until the narrator
and the singer worked together. In fact, the explanation behind Yeong-jin’s madness is not
included in the script. One of the most popular narrator, Song Dongho, intentionally attributed
Yeongjin’s madness to the torture he received from the Japanese. Song could only say the line if
there were no Japanese police present in the theater.65
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The song that Yeong-jin sings in the film is Na’s interpretation of a traditional Korean
folksong called “Arirang” that earned popularity as the film Arirang became popular. Na’s
“Arirang” is a sad song designed to evoke the trauma of domination and the gravity of
attempting to maintain a cultural identity while under occupation. It is important to note that the
traditional song “Arirang” was not a song specifically designed to evoke sadness. Used to
express common people’s happiness, hardships, love, and loss (hŭi-no-ae-lak), versions varied in
pace and tone depending on the area. In some areas, farmers even sang the song as an upbeat
harvest song. Yet Na’s 1926 film Arirang deliberately incorporates a sad and slow melody
combined with wistful lyrics to recreate the folk song as a Korean cultural song of anti-Japanese
sentiment.66
Arirang, Arirang, Arariyo
You are going over the Arirang Hill.
You who are leaving me
Will hurt your feet before you even went ten li.
The refrain, “Arirang, Arirang, Arariyo / You are going over Arirang Hill,” is followed by
different verses. Arirang Hill, a fictional metaphor for hardship, represents Japanese colonialism.
The hill obstructs people from getting to the other side, but Koreans will climb and eventually
get over the hill. The going over of Arirang Hill represents Koreans’ determination to overcome
any difficulties.67 The historical context combined with the slow tempo that Na chose for the
song in his film, the “Arirang” was reinvented in the film as a sad song. The song is heard eight
times in total in the film including at the end and audiences cried as they sang the song they
knew by heart.68
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Arirang first showed in Dan Sung Sa theater in Seoul. Many narrators remembered the
film and picked it to be the best representation of early Korean film. 69 Thus, Arirang was the
start of minjok film, a film that reinforced a sense of a united identity separate from the Japaneseimposed assimilation and evoked a sense of pride that is only shared by Koreans. Even now,
when Korea is divided into North and South, “Arirang” serves as a reminder that both parts of
Korea survived the same trauma at the hands of the Japanese.70
Other pre-liberation films also called Koreans to action under the oppression of the
Japanese, but they did so more discreetly or less effectively due to strict policies that aimed to
restrict the preservation of Korean cultural identity. Na’s ingenious idea was to place a story
within a story (hallucination) to more subtly hint at the evil of Japanese colonialism.71 Later
directors followed Na’s lead and used metaphors to hide their true intentions of criticizing
Japanese colonialism. One example is Season for Singing (1930) directed by Ahn Jong-hwa. The
film starts with a couple in love in a rural town in Korea. They are both from the working class,
representing honest hard-working Koreans. The villain, a wealthy landowner on whose land the
woman’s father and the man work, sees the woman and wants her for himself. He threatens the
woman’s father that he will kick the father out of his land if he does not make his daughter his
concubine. The powerless father has no choice and the woman becomes the landowner’s
concubine and moves to the large city of Seoul. The young man comes to Seoul to reveal the
landowner’s villainy towards many other working-class young women, and the villain commits
suicide in humiliation. The couple return to their rural hometown where they once again see the
land, and they both softly start to sing their song of childhood.
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Another example is Tuition (1940 Dir. Choi In-Gyu and Bang Han-Jun) that appears to
depict the Japanese as kind and helpful to the Koreans. In the film, a Japanese schoolteacher sees
one student who cannot come to school because he cannot pay the tuition. The teacher visits the
boy’s home and gives him enough money to pay for his tuition. However, the landlord takes the
money for rent, and the boy has to walk to his relative’s house to borrow money for the tuition.
In depicting this journey directors include long scenes of beautiful scenery of rural Korea that
was not included in the original script.
Despite the subtle resistance, the film, based on a Japanese screenplay adapted to Korean
by two Korean directors, is openly pro-Japanese in its message. However, the film was never
available in Japanese theaters because of the reality it reflected. Korean students are so poor that
they have no money to get an education – an education that is a given right and mandatory in
Japan. The images of Korea in the film did not align with the Japanese imperial ideologies.
Despite various efforts, minjok films did not always go undetected. By law all Korean
films had to get approvals from the Japanese government. Japanese censorship edited many preliberation Korean films so heavily that the plot did not make sense. A group of directors
migrated to Shanghai at the end of 1920s to escape heavy censorship and made openly antiJapanese films such as The Soul of Patriotism72 (Dir. Jeong Gi-tak, 1928).73 Although their films
were never released in Korea, it was popular with the Chinese audience for anti-Japanese
sentiments as well as leftist themes.74
Films such as Field Mouse (1927 dir. Na Woon-Gyu) and Jongno (1933 dir. Yang Chul)
are some examples. Field Mouse in particular was brutally cut with new subtitles because of
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Na’s success with Arirang the previous year. Arirang sparked a sense of national identity that
could not be repressed by policies or censorship. Following Arirang, minjok films urged the
nation to unite against the foreign Other by depicting the very trauma onscreen and eliciting
emotional responses. Several years immediately following the liberation, Korean films still
depicted the national trauma of domination but from the position of a victor, not a mere
headstrong victim.
In 1945, the Japanese surrendered to the allies, effectively ending Japanese domination
over Korea. Post-liberation Korea focused on eradicating the aftermath of Japanese colonialism
and restoring “Korean” order. The Korean order, however, was not as unified and coherent as it
appeared, especially because the nation was heavily influenced by two contrasting ideologies of
the Soviet Union and the United States. The two nations’ different ideologies resonated strongly
in Korea where two foreign ideas were both presented as modern and anti-Japanese alternatives
for a new Korea.
Although liberation films were popular after independence from Japan, Korean
filmmakers soon faced the need to rethink what it meant to create Korean films as the market
further flourished and audiences began to demand Hollywood entertainment films. Korean
postliberation films were considered too didactic, political, and not as entertaining because the
primary purpose of postliberation films was to devise a national identity. Different factors
impacted the dropping popularity of Korean postliberation films, and one major factor was the
influx of U.S. films during American military rule (1945-48). Upon the surrender of Japan, both
the Soviet Union and the U.S. each claimed half of the peninsula. The U.S. established a military
government and stationed soldiers throughout South Korea. The U.S. military rule (1945-48)
recognized films as a “useful medium to gain cultural, economic, and political profits,” and saw
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Korea as a market.75 Thus, the Korean film industry was neglected while the military rule
focused on importing Hollywood films to Korea.
During U.S. military rule artists with leftist political ideas were strictly regulated. Dongho Kim writes that the policy of the U.S. military rule worked to suppress socialist movement
and perpetuate democracy as well as take advantage of the readily available local consumers.76
The movement started at the periphery with the opening up of domestic markets. U.S. military
rule clashed with the heretofore maintained notion that films operated as containers of the
culture, not just as commodities. Throughout U.S. military rule and the Korean War, Korean
audiences were exposed to Hollywood entertainment films that fared much better than domestic
films that were still heavily political and ideological. Only after the Korean War did South Korea
develop its own solutions to reinterpret film as cultural artifacts that still appealed to the public.77
At mid-century, tensions arose between North and South Korea, each having formed
political alliances with the Soviet Union and the U.S. respectively. In 1950, the North Korean
army crossed the 38th parallel marking the division between North and South, and invaded the
upper part of South Korea with Soviet tanks and weaponry. The crossing of the 38 parallel
marked the beginning of the Korean War, which lasted three years from 1950-1953 and further
influenced the film industry. Kim, Baek, and Lim identify “Korean Realism” as a style that
flourished during war times. Korean Realism is a combination of archival, newsreel, and drama
films that portrayed the impact of the war on individual victims.78 Often, the subject of Korean
Realism was women on the streets who were swarmed with the chaos of war and the blurring of
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ethics. At the same time entertainment films flourished during a time when audiences demanded
an escape from reality. These entertainment films were often based on Hollywood films that
were widely available from the previous military rule.
Post-Korean War, the South Korean government focused on supporting the film industry
with tax breaks in an attempt to promote Korean film production and consumption starting in
1954.79 Korean film production increased from eighteen in 1954 to ninety by 1960.80 (158). By
1958, the Korean government provided incentives for exported Korean films and international
film festival nominees.81 Park Chung-hee’s military regime (1963-1979) also supported an
exportation-based economy through films and other products. Eventually, however, the demand
for imported films outweighed the costs of importing and playing them at the theaters. Kim
writes that more numbers of Korean films were produced and played at theaters in Korea in the
late ‘60s, but foreign films yielded more profit with more consumers.82 Despite the high cost of
importing the films, foreign films guaranteed a good return.
After Park’s military regime, the Korean film industry moved away from government
control and protection to more liberal and competition driven.83 At the same time, the import
quota system of 1963 was revoked in 1984, allowing foreign films to freely enter Korean market.
Many Korean filmmakers and production companies opposed the distribution centers and formed
the Anti-Direct Distribution of U.S. Films Commission in 1988 to condemn the government as
anti-nationalist for supporting Hollywood films over domestic ones. The Commission believed in
the revival of minjok film as a cultural product that promoted independence, democratization,
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and unification. However, the minjok film discourse clashed with the Korean marketplace that
centered around entertainment films, especially Hollywood ones. Eventually the Commission
dissipated as it became clearer that audiences demanded entertainment over political ideology.
The opening of the Korean film market thus instigated the shift in focus from insular films
influenced by minjok films to exportable Korean films. The opening of the market also led to less
state regulation and more economic support of the industry as it struggled to compete with the
influx of foreign films that were in high demand.
The Korean government placed the key to success for the Korean film industry, along
with other industrial sectors, with exportation. Since the early 1960s, national success relied on
an economy based on exportation. For the film industry, the ultimate goal was to export to
Hollywood since the U.S. film market was seen as essential to reaching a global audience
through the American market. In preparation for exportation, the government created an
incentive along with policies for international film festival submission policy in the early ‘80s.84
This policy prioritized both industrial success and an inherent national identity that
celebrated Korea.85 The government attempted to restrict films that portrayed the nation as weak
or ineffective from being shown to the audiences outside Korea. In other words, exported films
carefully curated and portrayed the image of masculinity. The implied social norm is the myth of
masculinity that still reflects the national trauma of domination but focuses on the victory of the
Korean masculine strength. The fact remains that Korea was dominated by an Other. However,
the Other (necessarily portrayed as a male Other from a Confucian perspective) has been
defeated because the Self is even more powerful (and therefore more masculine). With the U.S.
as the intended audience, Korea purposefully perpetuated the image of a strong masculine Korea.
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Conclusion: Masculinity and Kim Ki-duk’s Arirang (2011)
National myths are inherently problematic in their refusal to recognize multiplicity in the
idea of a nation. Instead of also acknowledging marginalized and non-normative voices, a
national myth overrides them and presents a national identity as if it were wholesome and
absolute. A national myth functions to homogenize diverse groups that exist within a nation; it
poses a unified idea of the nation’s experience with trauma. The myth of masculinity in
postcolonial Korea overrides non-male experiences and voices of national trauma. Almost a
century after Na’s Arirang in 1926, director Kim Ki-duk named his documentary Arirang (2011)
appropriating the masculinity that has been embedded in Korean cinema since colonialism.
Arirang (2011) premiered at 2011 Cannes Film Festival and was named the best film in the
section Un Certain Regard. Kim Ki-duk’s Arirang (2011) is one representation of how
masculinity appropriates national trauma and recreates a national identity that is focused only on
male subjectivity – there is room only for the traumatized male self. The myth of masculinity is
so prevalent that Kim fails to recognize that his voice is prioritized at the expense of others who
are silenced and underrepresented.
Kim Ki-duk was the first Korean film director to receive an award at an international film
festival when, in 2004, Samaritan Girl was awarded second-place (Silver Bear) at the Berlin
International Festival. The film portrays Kim’s signature worldview on women: Madonna vs.
whore. A high-school girl prostitutes herself and “heals” the men she sleeps with – she wants to
become Basumilda, a prostitute in Indian folklore who sells her body and leads men to the right
ways of Buddhism. The young girl’s sexuality is key to redeeming the men in this film. In the
same year, Kim’s 3-Iron received another second-place award (Silver Lion) at the Venice Film
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Festival for best direction. The protagonist in 3-Iron is a young man who distributes flyers on his
expensive motorcycle. He appears well-educated and well-to-do, but he has no stable job or
home; he breaks into various empty houses to find shelter at night. One day he finds an abused
woman in a house he breaks into, and the two travel together. The young man’s actions remind
one of reverse colonialism – he breaks into people’s houses, but he does not plunder. Instead, he
cleans the house, fixes electronics, and rescues a damsel in distress. The stoic young man in 3Iron is Kim’s masculine hero.
The two earlier films set the stage for Kim’s introspective documentary Arirang (2011) in
which the director elaborates on the two traumatic experiences that have prevented him from
producing films for the last three years. The lack of his film production is not only a personal
tragedy but also a national loss because he is a great Korean director that has proven himself
through international standards. Despite growing popularity, only a handful of Korean directors
are recognized in international festivals, and Kim is one of the first and most prominent directors
to be recognized.86 By naming his documentary Arirang Kim equates his personal loss to a
national loss because his work represents Korea in the international world. His personal narrative
turned national focuses on his subjective experience only.
Arirang (2011) captures Kim’s life in the woods from 2008 to 2011. There are two
traumas that confine Kim to the woods: a female actor almost dies while filming a hanging scene
in Dream (2008) and two associates leave Kim to make their own films. He recounts the accident
in 2008 and claims that he has been traumatized by the fact that he almost became a murderer for
his film. Without referencing the actor by her name or indicating any recognition for her near-
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death experience, Kim’s focus is centered on his experience of the incident as well as the lasting
repercussions on himself. While it is a debilitating experience for Kim, his emphasis on how the
trauma has depraved him of the willpower to produce more great films to be recognized by the
international film festivals, and therefore the trauma is a great loss on a national level, is
misplaced. In Kim’s embodiment of masculinity the male’s subjective experience (I almost
became a murderer) encompasses the actor’s experience (my actor almost died), rendering the
actor an object to be used and protected. It is not the actor’s near-death by hanging that is
important, but Kim’s failure as the masculine self to protect her and the impact that failure has on
Kim, the sole subject.
The second trauma in Arirang details the betrayal of one associate director and one
producer. Kim’s drunk monologue continues to tell the story of the two who each decide to
produce films independent of Kim. He sees their independence as an act of “betrayal” and
“abandonment” because he occupies the sole position of the masculine self. Internalization of
colonial structure and the dichotomy between the masculine Self and the dangerous Other
eradicates other subjectivities. Kim has helped the two debut as director and producer
respectively, providing his own screenplays and ideas as foundations. When the associate
director and producer go their separate ways and start producing films without consulting Kim,
the independence is construed as a personal insult, “an affront to [Kim’s] pride.” The myth of
masculinity and the dichotomy between the Self and Other only allows the two men to be an
object (belonging to Kim for use and protection) or a threatening Other.
The song “Arirang” is used at several points of the film, one of which appears towards
the end when drunk Kim repeats the chorus of the song and cries. The scene evokes sadness
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through the sad tunes of “Arirang” as well as the sobbing director. Other scenes use “Chŏngsŏn
Arirang,” a version of Arirang from Kangwŏn Province.
Kim purports to have come to represent the Korean spirit itself through his art. We are
designed to hate the two associates and justify Kim’s violence towards them at the end when he
builds a handgun. The two locations shown before off-screen gunshots are heard were the two
associates’ actual house and office. They did not find out that Kim was at their doorsteps until
after the film was released.87 In the last scene, we see Kim pointing the gun at himself. Offscreen
we hear a shot and see a series of Kim’s film posters from 1996 onwards. “Chŏngsŏn Arirang”
plays in the background as the audiences are left to think that none of the wonderful films that
Kim has created so far would have existed if Kim had died. The song taken and used by the
director in this scene once again evokes a sense of loss on a national level.
The documentary Arirang (2011) won an award for best film in the Un Certain Regard
category from the Cannes Film Festival. Kim went on to make multiple internationally
successful films like Pieta (2012), which received the Golden Lion award at the Venice Film
Festival. Ultimately Kim is unable to recognize his own appropriation of national trauma, and the
perpetuation of masculinity in his films. Korean cinema is known for masculinity to global
audiences because the myth functions to erase multiplicities. Male voices dominate the national
discourse at the expense of silenced voices – and, worse, the world is celebrating it.
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Chapter 2 Asian Financial Crisis and the Evolving Myth of Masculinity
The myth of masculinity changed with the changing responsibilities and abilities of the
patriarch. In early 2000s Korean films begin to feature financially or socially powerless
patriarchs – unemployed fathers, alcoholic fathers, cuckolded fathers – during and after the 1997
Asian financial crisis. These patriarchs have failed to protect their family, and their violence is
not justified. Unlike earlier films, Korean films in the 2000s feature fathers who are no longer
capable of providing financially for the family. With the Asian financial crisis, the myth of
masculinity rebrands itself to separate from the now-criticized authoritarian. As the myth of
masculinity evolve beyond an authoritative father-figure, post-financial crisis films portray
patriarchs as the stubborn and uncompromising villains.
The creation of the myth of masculinity, stemming from the colonial experience,
celebrated male violence against a national Other. The myth first intertwined with the image of
the patriarch – an all-knowing authoritative father-figure who has the power to look after his
family. The masculine patriarch protected the family against the Other, be it the Japanese during
and after colonialism or the North Koreans after the Korean War (1950-1953). Liberation from
Japanese colonialism in 1945 indicated a period of clash between different political ideologies
within Korea. Soviet Union troops had occupied northern Korea prior to Japan’s defeat, while
U.S. troops were occupying southern Korea. With the end of WWII and Japanese colonialism of
Korea, Soviet Union and U.S. had agreed to temporarily divide the country to each oversee the
parts until Korea had enough infrastructure for sovereignty.88 However, neither ideology yielded
to the other, and South Korea set up its own sovereignty in 1948, after three years of U.S.
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military rule. The tension between the two parts of Korea, each fueled by either Soviet Union or
U.S. support, culminated in a war between North and South Korea in the summer of 1950.
After the 1953 truce, South Korean government started restoring order, and policies were
created to protect the Korean film industry.89 Postwar Korea craved entertainment, and film was
one of them.90 In particular, period pieces flooded the market with the success of Chunhyangjeon
[Story of Chunhyang] written and directed by Lee Gyu-hwan in 1955. Although the film is based
on a traditional folktale that had already been retold in many different forms such as pansori,
Chunhyangjeon broke the box record with 180,000 people within 2 months of opening.91
At the same time, the films focused on celebrating responsible fathers that protect the
family and see that their family flourishes under his guidance. These films functioned as a means
to legitimize Park Chung-hee’s military regime through the metaphor of the patriarch that sees
over his family (citizens) against the dangerous Other (North Koreans). Even in the ‘80s, after
the assassination of Park, the notion of a masculine went hand-in-hand with the patriarch.
Despite the end of Park’s era, the symbol of the strong father continued on with a new military
leader, Chun Doo-hwan.
Not until the ‘90s did the myth of masculinity begin to separate from the authoritative
patriarch. With the Asian financial crisis, the accelerated pace of modernization in Korea came to
a halt. The economic growth that had once provided a sense of pride and identity now left many
bewildered. Unemployment skyrocketed, leaving men, conventionally expected to provide
economically for their families, powerless and desperate. Films of this decade and the following
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decades start to portray an ineffective patriarch, failing in his own ways but still unwilling to
compromise with the new generation.
Masculinity tied to patriarchy leaves no room for people other than the all-knowing father
figure. The fall of strong patriarch seemingly opens room for individual desires to materialize
distinct from the family unit. However, the myth of masculinity that has resulted from the
historical trauma of domination exists beyond patriarchy, recreating masculinity separate from
authoritarian father-figures. The financial crisis becomes a turning point in which the myth of
masculinity separates itself from the authoritative patriarchal identity. Instead, the unreasonable
and aggressive patriarch is posed as the villain whose violence is not justified in the new
narratives of post-crisis films.
Park Chung-hee came to power in the 1960s with the main goal of modernizing Korea
mainly through economic growth. In the state-controlled economy, the film industry, along with
other sectors, expected economic and policy-related governmental support.92 In 1961, the film
industry, previously located within the Ministry of Culture, was incorporated into the Ministry of
Public Information for wider use of pro-regime propaganda films. Park’s modernization efforts
returned to the idea of a minjok or the ethnic group of Koreans; his notion of minjok identified
(South) Koreans as an anti-Communist group that was separate from North Koreans. Now,
minjok conveniently excluded North Koreans because they were primarily identified as
“communists,” not “Koreans.” Cultural policies, closely controlled by the government, reflected
the minjok-centered ideology.93 For example, many films in the ‘60s were retelling of folklores
or historical heroes’ journeys.94
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It is important to note that the Korean film industry in the 1960s was considered a
cultural commodity that the government controlled. Importation and exportation of films were
now part of international trade policy. In the ‘60s the government tried to protect the Korean film
market by requiring all directors and producers to be domestics with Korean citizenship.95
Requiring Korean citizenship specifically targeted foreign filmmakers in order to prevent them
from establishing companies in Korea because foreign films were more popular and profitable at
theaters. One interesting incentive to encourage domestic film production was to allow the
production company more importation rights to popular Hollywood films if their domestic films
received recognition or awards at international festivals.96 Producing a good domestic film
profited the production company in two ways: international (and domestic) recognition and more
rights to import the popular foreign films.
Domestic films in the ‘60s regularly featured the power struggle between an aging
patriarch and the emerging younger male generation portrayed through melodrama. Most
conflicts end with an acceptance on the patriarch’s part that the new generation has come to
power, and that it is time to step down to make room for their sons or sons-in-law.97 The new
generation then takes over the role of patriarch in the family. This new generation symbolized
westernization, modernization, as well as a strengthening of the minjok-oriented nation.98 In this
power transition there is no room for women except certain stereotypical roles of docile wife and
caring mother. Westernization in men is intelligence, improvement, and innovation; in women,
especially when portrayed as defying or rebelling against the patriarch, it is vulgar, obscene, and
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selfish.99 Under the myth of masculinity there is no room for women’s participation in the new
nation-building. The films were used to support Park’s military regime and the goal of
modernization even at the expense of marginalized social groups such as women, children, and
the weak. By the end of ‘60s and the beginning of ‘70s, labor movement and democratizers
started resisting Park’s regime and its propaganda for oppression and marginalization. I will be
discussing the clash between the democratizers and the modernizers more in detail in chapter
three.
In the ‘70s, Park had a stricter grasp on how Korean culture was to be represented
onscreen. Anti-government sentiments, implied or otherwise, were banned, and many scenes
were censored by the cultural department of the government. Naturally some directors opposed
the censorship, but the theaters were not allowed to exhibit films not approved by the
government. Some directors who spoke against such censorship were imprisoned. Of the films
that survived strict censorship, many celebrated Park’s regime, often incorporating actionoriented plots popular in Hong Kong cinema. “The movies produced in the early 1970s had no
choice but to portray government-directed themes—such as anticommunism, the establishment
of national identity, and the rationalization of the Yusin System—in return for government
subsidies.”100 The Yushin System had been a new constitution announced in early 1970s. In
1971, Park declared a state of national emergency in regards to the conflict with North Korea.
One year later, he suspended the constitution and dissolved legislature to announce Yushin
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System that ensured Park with both the intermediating functions of the executive, legislative, and
judicial powers, as well as state power to determine matters of state affairs.101
The Yushin Constitution recognized the President as the supreme leader who was
primarily responsible for both independence and continuity of the Sate and unification of
the fatherland. The presidential power under the Yushin system was understood as that of
the supreme leader who had concentrated all political power of the state in the hands oof
the President himself.”102
The Yushin System legitimized Park’s regime as well as allow it absolute control over the
country. Without government subsidy, very few films could be made, but without government
approval, no films could be distributed.
The cultural policies of the ‘70s aimed to present government-driven minjok discourse in
a favorable and modern light. In 1972 a detailed cultural policy indicated that a “good” Korean
cultural product established the right national history, created new minjok-oriented arts, elevated
Koreans’ cultural standards through popularization of the arts, and promoted Korean culture
through international exchange of culture and arts.103 With the last point in particular, Park was
intending to transition to an export-oriented economy and continued to use international
recognition of Korean films as a license to import profitable foreign films to Korea.
One of the most ambitious yet ultimately unsuccessful projects that the Korean Film
Association (now Korean Film Council KOFIC) promoted was state policy films (kukch’aek
yŏnghwa). The standard for state policy films were based on a 1973 decree on what makes a
good Korean film: films that are pro-Park’s regime and its efforts for economic growth; films
that establish a minjok identity and promote a national character; films that encourage traditional
cultural development in rural areas; films that feature industrial workers contributing to
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modernization efforts; and films that emphasize solidarity.104 The goal of state policy films was
to justify Park’s militaristic regime and promote the film industry through chaebols, a handful of
rich companies in Korea that received socioeconomic support from the government. Park’s
regime aimed to spark a speedy economic growth through the chaebols, which in turn focused on
industrial modernization with the help of favorable policies from the government. Kyung-Sup
Chang identifies the characteristics of chaebol as:
Over-concentration of both corporate ownership and management; merging of ownership
and management; over-ambitious ‘department-store-style’ diversification of business
operations; rapid growth orientation (as opposed to stable profit making); excessive
reliance on bank loans and concomitant excessive debt ratios; exaggeration of corporate
assets on the basis of reciprocal investment among member corporations; aggressive
collusion with political and bureaucratic leaders usually through bribing; and despotic
control of labor.105
He argues that the emphasis on chaebols, which allowed for the initial rapid economic expansion
or compressed modernity as further discussed in chapter three, was also the main cause of the
financial disaster.
In Korea, modernization and democratization did not happen all at once; rather,
modernization was at first opposed by and subsequently followed by democratization. In the
‘60s, Park Chung-hee came to power through a military coup and focused on modernization
including building an export-oriented economy in the war-torn Korea. Human rights were not a
concern for the Park regime, and many were imprisoned or tortured for opposing Park. Park’s
strict anti-North Korean and pro-U.S. policies also caused some rebellion from pro-North Korean
democratizers who saw unification as a long-term goal. Park was assassinated in 1979 by Kim
Jae-Gyu, an ex-military general and the director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency who
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started to question Park’s regime. Kim was executed for murder, and thus the tide of political
power did not turn over immediately to the democratizers with the assassination of Park.
However, more voices in the public called out for human rights that were sometimes blatantly
absent in the economy-centered policies of the government.
In the ‘80s the government seemingly loosened its grip on film censorship under Chun
Doo-hwan’s military regime (1980-1988). Moving away from politics and conspicuous
propaganda, more films featured romantic relationships between men and women.106 These films
were aimed to provide a momentary relief or entertainment to the citizens and divert their
attention away from the current government.107 One particular example is Madame Aema (Dir.
Jeong In-Yeop, 1982) that spawned a series of thirteen films between 1982 and 1996.108 More
recently new Madame Aema 2016 (Dir. Kim Mi-yeon, 2016) released but with little connection
to the original series. Although the film features a woman engaged in sex with multiple men
while her husband is imprisoned, she ultimately returns to him when he is released. Kang argues
that the ending implies that women are still portrayed as sexual objects that respond to male
desires.109 The relaxed censorship on sexuality did not indicate that Chun’s military regime was
more open than Park’s. In fact, anti-government sentiment was still severely censored, even more
so in the lead-up to the Seoul Olympics in 1988. In preparation for the Olympics the government
increased the cultural sector budget by 3.3 times in 1986, which were invested in the building of
large-scale cultural facilities such as National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art
(MMCA), Seoul Arts Center, and the National Gugak Orchestra.110 Enough money was flowing
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but content was more closely regulated than ever, censoring any criticism against the government
or any negative image of the nation. For example, media did not report on possible anti-U.S.
sentiments in the creation of Youth Film Council in 1980 consisted of assistant directors,
independent film-makers, film scholars and university film associations.111
One crucial change to the Korean film industry came in 1985. South Korea and the U.S.
agreed to allow foreign films and distribution companies to set up in Korea beginning in 1987.
The U.S. had pressured Korean film markets to open to free trade since the end of ‘70s.112
According to Jin, “the MPEAA [Motion Picture Export Association of America] acknowledged
that Korean cinema would be a big market for Hollywood, because Korean audiences already
liked Hollywood movies more than local films. Even during the recession in the domestic film
industry, Koreans still went to theaters to watch Hollywood films.”113 The MPEAA soon
demanded that U.S. distribution companies be treated equally to domestic ones once they set up
in Korea.
The film treaty resulted in policy changes within Korea to help protect and promote the
domestic film industry. First, the registration deposit that each registered film production and
distribution company had to pay decreased from 700 million won (app. 580,000 USD) to 50
million won (app. 4,000 USD). As a result, more companies could afford to produce and
promoted film diversity.114 Moreover, for independent producers the deposit fee decreased from
90% of their total budget to 10%, allowing more independent filmmakers to produce films.115 By
1985, film makers did not have to get approval from the Minister of Culture and Public
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Information before production.116 These new policies provided a bit of hope during the difficult
times for the Korean filmmakers competing with free-flowing Hollywood films.
Another change was the new goal of international recognition. Korean filmmakers of the
‘80s struggled to gain fame at well-known international film festivals such as Cannes or Venice.
The Hut (Dir. Lee Doo-yong 1981) was the first to receive recognition by an international film
festival. At the Venice Film Festival The Hut received the Integrated Social Development
Assistance Program (ISDAP) award. Not much is known about ISDAP award, but Korean Film
Council (KOFIC) writes that it is equivalent to Special Directing Award.117 The film portrays a
woman’s vengeance through various genres combined such as melodrama, thriller, and mystery.
In 1987, Lim Kwon Taek’s The Surrogate Woman won numerous accolades at the Asian Film
Festival along with a Best Actress Award at Venice Film Festival.118
The following military regime headed by Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) functioned similarly
as the previous one in terms of its policies, focusing on justifying the undemocratic procedures of
the oppressive regime. On the surface, Roh’s regime focused on investing in cultural institutions
and products to increase a sense of national cultural sensibility.119 In reality, however, with
diversity and creativity severely repressed, the investments and projects resulted in little more
than exhibitions of cultural support.120 Politically, content with antagonism towards ally
countries, especially the U.S., as well as support of leftist ideology and criticism against Roh’s
regime were strictly forbidden.121
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Beginning in 1988, as per a South Korea-U.S. agreement, Hollywood studios entered the
Korean market. Jin describes it thusly:
UIP and 20th Century Fox established their branches in 1988, followed by Warner Bros.
(1989), Columbia TriStar (1990), and Buena Vista (1993). Together, they imported a total of 818
foreign films between 1988 and 2001. […] Proactive neoliberal cultural reforms since the late
1980s have substantially influenced Hollywood’s investment in the Korean film industry. As the
Korean government, sometimes forced by transnational forces and at other times voluntarily,
opened the domestic film market, many transnational corporations—in particular, Hollywood
studios—played a key role, including in distribution, production, and exhibition. As discussed,
several Hollywood studios established their branches for the direct distribution of their own
films, and some of them formed strategic alliances with domestic capitals, including Samsung, to
produce films in Korea.122
Market deregulation led to a crisis for the domestic film industry as anticipated by film-makers
and distributors. One of the main reasons was the preexisting and overwhelming demand for
Hollywood films over domestic ones. Knowing this, many distributors and exhibitors focused on
procuring popular Hollywood films to show at the theaters while some directors imitated
successful Hollywood film narrative and structure.

“IMF Crisis” and the Fall of the Patriarch
The 1990s became a turning point in the Korean celebration of the “strict but fair”
authoritarian. In 1993, Kim Young Sam successfully became the first non-military president in
over three decades. For citizens, Kim’s campaign success symbolized a start of a truly
democratic Korea. Media offered hopeful news of how the peaceful transition of power from
Roh to Kim indicated how far Korea had developed in terms of democracy. However, the reality
was corruption and continued support for the chaebols. The peaceful and democratic transition of
power to Kim’s regime did not guarantee a actually significant difference in the policies. Kim’s
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policies still supported many of familiar non-democratic procedures such as elitism and
nepotism.123
The film industry did go through some changes under Kim. While former regimes still
saw film mostly as a means to justify their regime and spread propaganda, Kim’s regime
regarded film as an industry to contribute to economic growth in Korea.124 Censorship began
relaxing their control over content, and film was newly categorized under the manufacturing
industry rather than service industry. In other words, Kim’s government actively promoted
production of film as a cultural industry rather than a passive marketplace for foreign
products.125 This major change led to various financial benefits for the film industry such as
reducing production costs and easier export of films.
As film was recognized as an industry and not just propaganda, money began to flow in
from different areas. In 1994 the KOFIC started loaning up to 200 million won (app. 160
thousand USD) per film.126 The loans were not designed to promote cultural diversity or
expression, however, but instead to promote film as an industry. The films had to first and
foremost sell well as a good industrial product. Only a few companies already established
enough could afford the security deposit, and many small productions or individual filmmakers
were unable to take advantage of the loans.
Instead, individual filmmakers relied on chaebols as more multinational corporations
started investing in film as an industrial product. By the mid-1990s, chaebols funded the entirety
of the budget—full investment meant vertical integration in which the chaebol companies would
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manage production and exhibition, often establishing their own entertainment departments.127
Most chaebol companies dissolved or sold their share in the film business, however, between
1998 and 1999 due to low profits and the impact of the financial crisis in East Asia.128
In 1997 many Asian markets showed the long-term signs of housing bubbles and foreign
dollar to domestic currency discrepancies. In June, Thailand’s baht to the US dollar parity
crashed, and Indonesia soon followed. In Korea, the value of Korean won plummeted, causing a
chain reaction in its export-heavy economy:
The government defended its value by buying won on the open market with its precious
foreign reserves. But those foreign reserves weren’t enough. The won went into free-fall.
[…] In a country that depends on exporting goods to other countries, a drop in the value
of the national currency can be a lethal blow to the stability of the economy.129
The unprecedented pace of modernization in Korea ended abruptly. By November, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in.
The IMF and other international financial institutions offered $58.4 billion to bail Korea
out. This amount was not given all at once, but instead divided over time in exchange for
structural and economic reforms mandated by the IMF. Of the total proposed amount of $58.4,
the initial plan was for the IMF and other institutions to first provide $35 billion in small
installments. The remaining $23.4 billion was to be reserved as a “second line of defense that
would be made available to Korea by G-7 countries only if the initial amount of $35 billion
contributed by the IMF and other multilateral institutions proved inadequate.”130 On December
19, after two small installments that failed to invigorate the economy in Korea, the U.S.
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government intervened on behalf of the Korean government and persuaded the IMF to enter a
new round of negotiations. Instead of small installments over time, Korean government asked for
larger proportion of the proposed budget.131 The IMF intervention functioned as a form of
economic colonialism.
Kim Kihwan identifies three major triggers that caused the financial crisis in Korea. The
U.S. dollar became stronger in comparison to Korean won, leaving the Korean government to
use its foreign currency reserves and thus leaving very few reserves.132 At the same time, the
U.S. dollar to Japanese yen ratio changed significantly when the U.S. dollar gained value,
leaving Korea deprived of its competitiveness in exports, the main mode of Korea’s economy.133
A significant portion of foreign investment decreased in a few years, shaking the whole
economical structure of Korea. Lastly, as chaebol groups started experiencing financial
difficulty, they relied on the government to bail them out, as they had in the past. However, the
neoliberal market principles that the new government employed prevented the government from
doing so. Hanbo, Sammi, Jinro, and Kia, among others, declared bankruptcy.134 By 1996, “the
combined sales by the top thirty chaebol groups accounted for almost 48 per cent of South
Korea’s total output.”135 Thus, it was not surprising that when chaebols were in trouble during
the financial crisis. The whole country was in crisis mode. With the chaebols responsible for a
majority of economic development in Korea going bankrupt, the Korean economy was left
bereft.
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Prior to the IMF Crisis Korea had developed at an alarming rate. Kyung-Sup Chang calls
this process of development “compressed modernity.” Compressed modernity refers to the rapid
modernization that occurred in Korea after the Korean War (1950-53), “achieving over a mere
few decades what took Westerners two or three centuries.”136 However, compressed modernity
became a source of anxiety in Korea as it became clear that this “miracle” was not sustainable.
Compressed modernity describes not only rapid industrial and economic development, but also
the anxieties resulting from it: “Compressed modernity became a source of anxiety in Korea as it
became clear that this “miracle” of modernity was not sustainable. As the IMF Crisis proved, all
that had been “built up in such a hurry turn[ed] out to be [a] highly collapse-prone economic,
political and social system.”137
One crucial political fracture happened in the clash between modernizers and
democratizers. Modernizers supported and benefited from the rapid economic growth, sometimes
at the expense of minority groups. When the economic growth came to a halt, advocates for
social and political oppression claimed the need to democratize the nation. Democratizers had
often been victims of political oppression themselves, including some that had been imprisoned
for their lack of support for the military regimes. However, it is important to note that the
democratizers were not centered around civilians, but a political ideology.
[The democratizers’] fight for democracy was not intended to give political power into
[citizens’] hands. Their career of struggling against military dictators did not develop into
an organized capacity for representing civil social forces and interests in institutional
politics. These politicians’ conception of political power was very much aristocratic,
albeit not too noble, and denying of civil access to it.138
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Democratizers operated under a different ideology, guaranteeing citizens protection from
wrongful imprisonment or torture, but they were not dispersing political power to civilians.
Democratizers emphasized how voting for them would benefit the citizens who had been
oppressed for disagreeing with the past modernizers’ regimes, but in fact the votes yielded more
benefits for the democratizers themselves who rose to power and replaced the modernizers.
With the IMF crisis and the resulting liberalization of the economy, as well as financial
reforms, came an increase of political power on democratizers’ part. Up until the late ‘90s,
modernizers had held onto power by displaying results in economic growth and compressed
modernity. However, the financial crisis changed the tide of the growth-oriented mindset that
prioritized economy over all else. Several factors surrounding the IMF crisis affected the
transition of power. One was the loss of faith in the current government of the time. Despite Kim
Young-sam being a non-military leader and a symbol of democracy, his policies were clearly
non-democratic. The country was not democratic enough, and the people could clearly see it.
The second factor was the growing anti-U.S. sentiment in post-IMF crisis Korea.
When the IMF intervened in Korea, the general sentiment was antagonistic even though
their loans bailed Korea out. Kim Kihwan identifies two goals for the IMF and other institutions’
intervention: (1) to reduce the likelihood of a similar crisis in the future by cleaning up the
balance sheets of financial institutions and (2) to evolve a financial system that can best help the
nation resume growth with stability.139 The IMF initially insisted on high interest rates from bank
loans in Korea, but the rates only ushered in further bankruptcy. “Banks, manufacturers, and
service-sector companies started failing left and right” while chaebols such as Samsung sold
parts of its company to stay afloat.140 Reassessing the situation, the IMF reversed its high interest
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rates in fall 1998. “The change had almost immediate results, with 1999 turning into a record
year, with growth of 10.9 percent. The crisis, finally, was over.”141 The IMF became a symbol of
Western interference, especially the U.S., and proved to be a “common enemy” for the Korean
citizens to unite against.
Along with an anti-West sentiment came the end of oppressive tyranny as the
democratizers argued for a necessary strength to protect the marginalized. Basic human rights
became a crucial issue, and the modernizers’ “father knows best” attitude were severely
criticized. Films such as The President’s Barber (2004 Dir. Lim Chan-sang), The Old Garden
(2006 Dir. Im Sang-soo), and 1987: When the Day Comes (2017 Dir. Jang Joon-hwan) portray
how the military regime and its modernization agenda attributed to oppressing, torturing, and
even murdering anyone who opposed them. It portrays how Korea rapidly modernized at the
expense of some people, and democratizers voice a need for a shift of focus onto human rights
and democratization.
The films were based on true incidents, and one major historical incident that featured
modernizers as brutal was the Gwangju Uprising – also known as Gwangju Democratization
Struggle or May 18 – from May 18-27, 1980. On May 18, students from Chonnam University
protested the military regime when the government troops blindly fired and killed many. Seeing
the brutality, citizens joined the protest and the whole city was up in arms. The exact number of
casualties are still unknown to this day as the records have been eradicated. Only after 2000 did
films openly address the incident.
The violence at Gwangju in 1980 had been silenced at great length, and it is not until
after the end of the military regimes that media discussed the incident. One of the first films that
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featured the Gwangju Incident as a source of trauma is Peppermint Candy (2000 Dir. Lee Changdong). Peppermint Candy begins in the spring of 1999 with the main character Yongho standing
on the train tracks screaming “I want to go back” as a fast-running train approaches him. The
film reverse-traces his life from a young innocent laborer in love to a failed businessman
abandoned by his family. In 1979, Yongho is a young man full of hope, working at a factory
alongside his first love. He is soon drafted to serve his mandatory military service for three years.
In the next sequence, an untrained and confused soldier Yongho accidentally kills a civilian girl
while he is at the site of the 1980 Gwangju Massacre. Mortified, he joins the police after his
military service to do some good. However, the police resort to torturing people, especially
democratizers and those against the oppressive military regime.
In the next chapter of his life, we see that Yongho has become an effective torturer by
1987, earning himself the nickname “Crazy Dog.” He does not hesitate to torture peaceful
protestors that demand democracy and basic human rights. In 1994, he has once again
transitioned into a different person—he is now a successful businessman. Unlike his outwardly
successful demeanor, however, his family is crumbling apart. His wife is cheating on him, and he
is cheating on his wife. He is neither loved nor respected by his children. Four years later in
1998, his business goes under during the IMF crisis and he loses everything, which leads into the
last sequence and the beginning of the film.
Depicting the 1980 Gwangju Incident as a traumatic moment in the film is possible
because the IMF crisis shattered the illusion that sacrificing a certain group of people in the name
of everlasting exponential economic growth was a moral good. The “greater cause” that had
shallowly justified the modernizers’ cruelty and oppression faltered with the financial crisis. The
film Peppermint Candy not only identifies the Gwangju Massacre as a crucial historical moment,
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but also emphasizes that we cannot greet the new millennium without addressing historical
wounds.142 The Gwangju Incident had been a prime example of how the military regime failed
citizens, and the cover-up of the incident only added to the incongruence between a modernizing
country and the totalitarian political climate. In Peppermint Candy, Yongho is corrupted by the
Gwangju Incident when he accidentally kills a girl, and the only way for him to adapt to the
brutal world is to take on a new role as a torturer. As the initial victim of the modernizers’
regime, Yongho becomes part of the perpetrators. At the beginning of the film he stands on the
train tracks facing the train, and the speeding train represents the brutal and non-stop force of
modernization and industrialization in Korean history. Yongho is yet another person who had
laid the tracks for the train, yet is also hit and annihilated by it at the end.
Post-IMF crisis films from 1999 began to vilify patriarchal aggressors instead of
celebrating them. Seung-ryul Kang writes that the IMF crisis crushed the dreams of a strong
patriarch leading the family and social structure to eternal growth spurt.143 Kang sees the
financial crisis as inspiring filmmakers to illustrate less macho, and more unstable, men that
symbolize a longing for the strong patriarch to return.144 But in the decades to come, the existing
notions of the patriarch would change from aggressors to protectors when the myth of
masculinity separated itself from patriarchy and rebranded to justify its violence. Before
examining the new masculine, however, it is important to analyze how films immediately
following the financial crisis depict powerless patriarchs turning spiteful.
Happy End (1999 Dir. Jung Ji-woo) is set during the financial crisis when banks start
laying off workers. The main character, Min Ki, is a husband and a father who used to work at
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the bank but is now unemployed. His wife, Bora, is the director of an English educational
institute. Bora begins to feel frustrated at Min Ki for not applying to new jobs but also not
helping with the baby. She tells him that if he wants to stay at home, he should be a full-time
stay-at-home dad and husband, looking after the baby and the house. Min Ki goes grocery
shopping and learns how to cook, often looking out of place but doing his best to adapt to the
new situation. Bora continues to find Min Ki’s shortcomings with household chores, and she
voices her opinions now that she is the sole breadwinner of the house. Humiliated but knowing
that he has no other choice, Min Ki continues to look after the baby and take care of the house
until one day he discovers that Bora has been cheating on him with a graphic designer named Ilbeom. Pushed over the edge, Min Ki murders his wife and frames Il-beom. The film ends with
Min Ki taking care of the baby alone.
Happy End signals the separation between the authoritative patriarch and the myth of
masculinity. Kang sees Happy End as a film with a man who cruelly murders his wife to restore
the patriarchal authority.145 By punishing the wife, Min Ki is attempting to restore order and his
own power in the family. However, I argue that the ending of this film is not a restoration but
renunciation of the “normal” patriarchal family. Min Ki the patriarch is so powerless that he feels
the need to murder his wife, but the murder does not change Min Ki’s situation as an
unemployed single dad. Blaming the wife is ultimately pointless. It is important to note that
although the film frames Min Ki as the main character and a better parent than Bora, his violence
is still not justified as a “good” resolution.
Happy End is a film that portrays the shortcomings of the patriarch, and how their
violence is no longer justified or celebrated.
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As the economy shut down in response to the monetary crisis at the end of the year,
factories and offices were dramatically oversaturated with salaried workers. The IMF
demanded that the laws against layoffs, as well as the general cultural tradition of jobsfor-life, end. They did. Unemployment shot up from 2.1 percent in 1996 to 6 percent in
1998. […] The change was startling to most Koreans. The idea of a bread-winner not
being able to find a job was an alien problem for the country, and people weren’t sure
how to handle it.146
Although Bora is cheating on Min Ki, we see some scenes that explain, perhaps almost justify,
Bora’s deviation. Min Ki refuses to communicate with his wife about his financial situation out
of pride. He manages to take care of their baby because he has no other choice. Meanwhile, Bora
has no issues supporting the family financially as long as she is not expected to do household
chores on top of her work. Min Ki doesn’t quite understand the situation and calls her “full of it”
or drunk on power even though Bora had been managing both reproductive and financial labor
until Min Ki lost his job. Contrary to Min Ki, Il-beom is a New Man. He has a steady job
adapting to the new technology-oriented world as a web designer, but he also cleans his house
and cooks for Bora. Il-beom is depicted as an understanding and responsible man compared to
Min Ki. Il-beom is not the new hero, however, because he too falls into the trap of aggression
towards Bora. He calls Bora repeatedly and would not take no for an answer. He begins to act
possessive, and his actions are not justifiable.

Conclusion
This chapter featured the Asian financial crisis in Korea as a turning point for the myth of
masculinity. Leading up to the IMF Crisis, modernizers dominated the political discourse. The
military-based regimes used media to legitimize oppression and state-led industrialization until
1993, and the Asian financial crisis has created an opportunity for democratizers to voice the
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dangers of economic prioritization over everything else.147 The late capitalist idea of perpetual
growth combined with quickness in Korea, and those who disagreed with the military regime and
its emphasis on economic growth were severely punished. Films prior to the financial crisis
celebrate strong all-knowing father-figures who protect their families. In other words, the myth
of masculinity fuses with patriarchy and justifies excessive violence against the Other (nonfamily) as not only necessary but also laudable.
The father-like leader’s time came to an end and eventually the economy crashed,
however, and the seemingly endless rapid economic growth came to an end. Unemployment
skyrocketed and the long-repressed critique of the modernizers began to flow freely. The allknowing and authoritative fathers were suddenly thrown into helplessness. This is the point in
which the myth of masculinity separates itself from patriarchy—films after the financial crisis
features authoritative and stubborn patriarchs as villains, and their violence is no longer justified.
Authoritative patriarchs are no longer the masculine heroes.
It is important to note that masculinity poses as a necessary and good violence, and its
main role is to protect. Prior to the financial crisis, masculinity justified strong patriarchs because
some violence and sacrifice led to the ultimate goal of economic growth. As perceptions change,
however, so does masculinity. Post-crisis films feature a different masculine, one that poses as a
protector of the weak and the oppressed. The new heroes of masculinity separate from patriarchy
are violent out of necessity and protect the weak with its powers against tyranny and oppression.
Former patriarchs are often portrayed as foils and villains in the face of these newly separated
masculine heroes for their stubborn claims to omnipotence and omniscience. Once again, their
violence is justified because they are providing protection to those who need it, i.e. women and

147

Jin, Transnational Korean Cinema, 111.

61

children. In the following chapter, we will take a close look at the new masculinity in Train to
Busan.

Chapter 3 Train to Busan, The New Masculine Patriarch, and the Public Good
On April 16, 2014, the Sewol ferry carrying mostly students from Danwon Highschool
on an annual trip sank on its way to Jeju Island, trapping and killing 304 people on board148. On
the day of the school trip, 325 students from Danwon High School boarded the ferry. School
trips to the popular island usually involves airplanes over ferries. However, as the ferry industry
dwindled because of increasing flights in the early 2000s, the Korean Maritime Administration
reached out to the Ministry of Education. At the request of the government, Danwon High
students set sail on the Sewol ferry to subsidize the shipping industry.149
In addition to the students and a few other passengers, the ferry was overloaded with
improperly secured cargo to yield a maximum profit for the ferry company. Incheon Port
Authority was aware of the violation but nonetheless allowed the ferry to sail.150 In fact,
according to Byung-hee Jo, a professor at Seoul National University Graduate School of Public
Health, such profit-over-safety mindset is what allowed Sewol ferry to continue being a
passenger ship in 2014. Sewol ferry had been a Japanese passenger ship for 18 years and was
officially retired before a Korean company bought it in 2012. Jo argues that Lee Myung-bak’s
neoliberal deregulation policy extended the ship’s service life from 25 to 30 years, justifying the
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change with additional profit the ferry would generate.151 In 2014, Lee was already under
investigation for corruption after his presidency, and Park Geun-hye of Lee’s same conservative
party was serving as the President. As the daughter of Park Chung Hee, Park Geun-hye had
continued his legacy as a modernizer while Lee had previously emphasized economic growth
based on his business acumen. When the Sewol ferry tragedy occurred, many blamed the lack of
infrastructure and training that could have prevented such disasters. Of 476 people on board, 304
died, including 250 Danwon High School students.
The Sewol ferry tragedy shocked the nation because it revealed how little concern is
given to training and safety as a whole. That lack directly correlated to the death of young
victims. Neither the ship crew nor the maritime police were equipped to deal with such accident
because they had not been properly trained. More than half of the crew on Sewol were temporary
workers, including the captain.152 The captain was on a one-year contract earning 60% of
permanent workers of the same position. It was, therefore, unrealistic to expect a professional
conduct when the workers had transient or limited work with no proper training.153 The captain
of the Sewol ferry told the passengers on the PA to remain seated while he and his crew took the
lifeboat to safety. Furthermore, the company that owned Sewol ferry spent the least amount
possible on safety trainings, spending a mere 54,000 won ($490) on a yearly training budget of
the entire company.154
The maritime police did not have the proper diving unit to deploy as the ship was sinking
before their eyes, losing what is called the “golden time” to rescue majority of the people on
board. While the maritime police were not efficient in the rescue mission itself, the more
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important problem is that safety and rescues were not prioritized as part of the police duty.155
The existing maritime police training prioritized protecting the fishing industry from illegal
Chinese fishing boats in the west coast over training to save lives.156 Because the maritime police
focused on preventing economic loss, it was not equipped to carry out a rescue mission despite
the fact that it is the only agency placed at the coast. As Yul Cho states, “the tragedy at
Paengmok Harbor is not an act of terror imposed upon a peaceful and organized country. This
incident merely exposed the abundance of irresponsible individual officials working for the
prejudiced power system.”157
As a result of such lack of procedure and safety, young victims were killed, trapped
inside the slowly sinking ship. In summer 2017 I visited the Paengmok Harbor where the Sewol
ferry had sunk three years earlier. Yellow ribbons, a symbol of the Sewol ferry tragedy, were tied
across the railings. Banners lined the sides of the harbor with messages focusing on finding the
missing bodies of victims: “Float the Sewol ferry if you have to scoop the entire ocean!” “There
are people still in the Sewol ferry. Every last person must return to the arms of their family!”
“We will not forget. We are with you.”
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One particular banner recounted the story of a mother being unable to purchase a new pair of
soccer shoes for her now-missing son. There were three pairs of soccer shoes placed underneath
the banner.
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Not far from the harbor stood a container set up as a temporary group memorial altar for victims
whose bodies had not been found. The banner on one side of the container has drawings of the
students safely ensconced in lotus flower with the words “Salvage the truth.” On the other side
contrasting this peaceful image is the sinking ferry and the words “Did you forget? 4.16.” Inside
the temporary altar, individual pictures of faces lined one wall of the container. On the table in
front of the wall of pictures were snacks, flowers, and candles placed by visitors. The smiling
faces of young students and several teachers provided a hard contrast against the banners leading
up from the harbor to the altar building.

While the victims of the tragedy were framed to be “children,” adults were framed as the
source of blame. One popular phrase that captured the national sentiment following the tragedy
was “Adults are sorry.”158 Journalists Dong-il Seo and Jung Soo Hong write how the older
generation, blinded by a sense of generational pride at modernizing the country, expressed guilt
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for failing to prevent such a tragedy.159 The guilt derives from the prioritization of economy and
modernization over safety. The sentiment newly tabled the existing political division in Korea:
the modernizers and the democratizers.
Hyung-min Joo outlines how the modernization theory, especially that the process of
economic growth eventually leads to a successful democratization, is not quite applicable to
Korea. Joo argues that the democratization in Korea is not an outcome of the linear process of
modernization but due to the agency of an opposing group. Thus, he distinguishes
“democratizers” from “modernizers.” Joo writes that “Park Chung-hee and his followers initiated
a rapid process of economic development under a dictatorial government, [while] it was the
progressive liberals who fought hard against a dictatorship and finally democratized the
country.”160
The main reason for such division was due to the rapid pace of modernization. Since
modernization occurred at such a rapid speed in Korea, the modernizers and the democratizers
were of the similar generation. Park Chung-hee came to power with a military coup in 1961 and
secured a life-term presidency by 1972. Essentially a military state, Park’s regime focused on a
strict control over the country. Not yet framed as a “modernizer,” Park was the conservative to
the opposing group of progressive liberals: the democratizers who struggled for democracy, state
welfare, distribution of wealth, and a closer relationship with North Korea.161
Only after the Asian financial crisis did the conservatives successfully rebrand
themselves as the modernizers who made economic growth possible. Joo writes that
conservatives lost presidential elections to democrats first in 1997 and then in 2002, during
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which time the 1997 Asian financial crisis wrecked the economy of Korea. Seeing an
opportunity, the conservatives rebranded as the modernizers able to rescue the country from
current financial disaster.
In response, conservatives popularized a catchy rhetoric of ‘a lost decade’ and made a
successful appeal to the people weary of economic hardships. […] Conservatives
skillfully reformulated their image from ‘dictators’ to ‘industrializers’ and ‘modernizers’
who had achieved ‘the miracle of Han’ under Park Chung-hee. As a result, the struggle
was no longer portrayed as between dictators and democratizers. Instead, it was described
as between those who had built the economy and those who were wrecking it.162
Opposing political parties now compete for power with different credentials: modernizers argue
that they built the country while the democratizers say they brought democracy.163
Modernizers came back into power starting with the election of Lee Myung-bak and
continuing onto Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the original modernizer. Park Geun-hye was the
president when the Sewol ferry tragedy occurred and democratizers soon framed the tragedy as
an example of how modernizers prioritized economy over human lives, ultimately leading to the
impeachment of Park Geun-hye and a regime change. Democratizers who had been repressed by
the modernizers, listed the tragedy as yet another example of the hidden cost of such fast
modernization: human beings. With modernizers in charge, economic success became a standard
through which one was judged, and it was prioritized over all else. By assigning “selfish adults”
(modernizers) to be the cause of the Sewol ferry incident, the democratizers successfully
impeached Park Geun-hye and reseized power.
As democratizers regained power, the masculine ideal changed from an all-knowing
father modeled after Park Chung-hee to a more caring and compassionate man – someone who
had been persecuted by the dictator for attempting to ensure basic human rights. As discussed in
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the previous chapter, the Asian Financial Crisis (1997) raises questions against an authoritative
father-figure who knows what is best. During the financial crisis the patriarch is no longer able to
economically provide for the family, a standard through which the masculine father was
established and justified as a protector and provider for his own unit. As a protector, the
masculine patriarch’s violence was justified as a means to an end. However, as the financial
crisis produced helpless fathers who could not provide for their families anymore, films reflected
these anxieties through depictions of men threatened by their financially independent wives.
The financial crisis as well as the Sewol ferry incident prompted many to question the
over-emphasis on economy and individual success over public good, political participation, and
tolerance in modern-day Korea.164 Instead, the new standard through which masculinity is
established is through the notion of public good.
When Train to Busan was released in theaters in 2016 as the first feature-length zombie
film, many recalled the 2014 Sewol ferry incident. Zombie films have served as means to
illuminate different human conditions in real life. The first zombie film as we know them –
cannibalistic zombies not under the control of an individual – begins with George A. Romero’s
Night of the Living Dead (1968).165 Romero relocated zombies from Haiti, recreating them to be
cannibalistic monsters. When he did, he not only redefined the characteristics of zombies in The
Night of the Living Dead (1968) to be cannibalistic, but he also explored the American national
trauma of racial inequality (Bishop 2009; Moreman 2010; Shaviro 1993). The film takes place in
a rural farmhouse. One striking scene in this film is when the last surviving human Ben, who
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happens to be a black man, is shot by rural rednecks who come to “rescue” people from the
zombies. After the first film, Romero went onto create his first zombie trilogy including Dawn of
the Dead (1978) and Day of the Dead (1985).166 The universal message in these three zombie
movies is that humans can be just as dangerous as zombies, if not more so.
When the genre transitions to Korea, the nature of zombies readily provides means to
replace some American social issues with uniquely Korean ones. Steven Shaviro, one of the first
zombie scholars, describes zombies as empty vessels without genuine purposeful actions.167
Zombies are empty in the sense that they are not tied to any cultural background. The origin of
cannibalistic zombies are American, but concept of zombies are universal because human life
and death is omnipresent.
The zombies in Train emphasizes already existing cruelties in our society as well as the
need to work together to survive. Killing zombies who look human and used to be human as
recently as seconds ago forces the characters to realize that humans have been cruel to each
other. When the main character steps on a zombie’s fingers to stay on the ladder, it alludes to the
fact that he had been doing so his whole life, stepping on others to get to where he is now. At the
same time such self-centered attitudes will not help in the zombie-infested world. The moral of
the story is expressed in the main character’s gradual realization that humans must help each
other to survive. As film journalist Kim Hyun Min critiques the film, it is rare to find a
blockbuster that clearly carries the director’s desire to be a better adult and a part of a better
society.168
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Director Yeon Sang-ho and Train to Busan
Train to Busan (director Yeon Sang-ho) was first released at the Cannes Film Festival on
May 13, 2016. It subsequently opened in theaters in South Korea on July 20, 2016, followed by a
limited release in the United States in the same month.169 The film has been referred to as the
first successful feature-length Korean zombie film, grossing more than $99 million worldwide by
September 2016.170 11.57 million people had been recorded at the theaters domestically.171
Before the release of Train to Busan, director Yeon Sang-ho was known for his works of
animation. His previous films also focus on social critiques and the problematic structures within
Korea. His debut film King of Pigs (2011), released to a limited number of theaters, won three
awards at Busan Film Festival and was nominated at various international festivals.172 The film
illustrates generational poverty, school bullying, and class conflict.173 The plot revolves around
two adult men who think back to their time in junior high in the 1980s when they were already
“weak” in comparison to the vicious bullies. The classroom functions as a prequel to the society
the two men now live in, and their situations have not changed in a meaningful sense.
His subsequent film The Fake (2013) deals with pseudo religions and cults. Yeon’s
second film was released in 75 theaters as opposed to 25 for King of Pigs. The Fake also
premiered in Toronto International on September 7, 2013.174 While pseudo religion is a major
focus of the film, it also features violent masculinity, the dichotomy between urban and rural
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towns, and poverty in tandem to provide a contextual view of Korean society.175 Sonia Mohedas
argues that this second film consolidated Yeon’s international profile.176
The increased recognition of Yeon’s work is clear in the distribution of Seoul Station
(2016), an animated zombie film that functions as a tandem to the live-action movie Train to
Busan. 177 Seoul Station was released in August and distributed to 440 theaters following the
financial success of Train.178 The two movies are not related in terms of characters or content,
but they both focus on dysfunctional society even before the zombies. The zombie outbreak in
Seoul Station is attributed to a large group of homeless people near Seoul Station, a major
railway station with both intercity trains and Seoul subway. The particular area has gone through
rapid development as evidenced by the Old Seoul Station preserved alongside the newly
constructed and expanded station currently in use. At the same time, the area is known for an
abundance of homeless people. The film shows a cruel yet widespread attitude towards the
homeless in Korea when people refuse to help or even listen to the homeless. A policeman points
his gun at two homeless men and one runaway girl even when surrounded by zombies, blaming
the homeless for what he understands to be social unrest. Yet the scariest point of the film is that
zombies are not why life is miserable for the main characters in the film: the homeless reside
near Seoul Station because they have nowhere else to go, while the runaway girl turns to
prostitution because she has no other option.
Unlike Train to Busan, Seoul Station truly embodies Yeon’s pessimistic view of Korean
society as can be seen by the ending of the animation. One of the few hopeful notes throughout
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the movie is the possible father-daughter reunion. In the last couple minutes of the movie, the
runaway girl finally sees her “father” who had been looking for her. It turns out that the man is
not her father but the violent pimp she ran away from. Chasing after her in the model house of an
expensive new apartment, he expresses frustration at not having access to such homes.
Desperation and poverty prevail. No one comes to the girl’s rescue, she dies, turns into a zombie,
and violently attacks the pimp.
Released in July, one month earlier than Seoul Station, Train to Busan opened in 1788
theaters throughout Korea and set the year’s record ticket sales at 11,567,218 tickets.179 Train to
Busan was Yeon’s first live-action feature-length film. The majority of Train is set on a moving
train, a marker of control and speed. A financially successful but emotionally unavailable father
Seok Woo takes his daughter Soo-an at her request to his ex-wife’s house in Busan. On the way,
they encounter a zombie virus outbreak, stemming from a young female passenger who stumbles
onto the train at the last minute with blood pouring down her legs. Seok Woo transforms from a
selfish survivor to a helpful asset to the group as he learns the importance of social good
throughout the journey. He dies protecting his daughter and a pregnant woman, Sung Gyeong,
who safely arrive at Busan where the military have successfully quarantined the city.
Train to Busan entails three major points of interest: the students, different masculinities,
and the representation of women in the film. The film problematizes how individual success is
prioritized over the public good in modern Korea through the depiction of a high school baseball
team that alludes to the Sewol ferry tragedy. The film also suggests a solution through the myth
of masculinity: Korea needs more masculine men who can protect the socially weak. In the
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process of emphasizing the need for more masculinity, however, the film limits the role of
women to be “mothers” and “daughters.”
Students in Train play an important role in Yeon’s critique of modern Korea where adults
to do not hesitate in sacrificing the weak and the young for their own benefit. The students in the
film allude to the high school students in the 2014 Sewol tragedy, an occurrence that spotlighted
the problems of prioritizing modernization and economic growth over all else. In Train to Busan,
no high school student survives. Zombies, who do not discriminate, kill most of them but
surviving adults also contribute to the deaths, especially when one adult uses a female student as
a human shield. Both the students in the film and the young victims of the ferry tragedy are the
future generation sacrificed by selfish adults.
The pristine order of the train and its attendants breaks down when the female train
attendant encounters patient zero, a young woman with a bitemark on her leg staggering onto the
train at the last minute. The female train attendant, immaculately dressed and eager to help,
approaches the young woman with concern. The young woman convulses on the floor and the
train attendant desperately radios the chief. In the next scene we see the train attendant walking
through the compartment with the high school students while the young woman, now zombified,
is mounted on her back biting her. Chaos ensues as patient zero attacks other students in the
compartment and the female attendant joins her as a zombie. The chief attendant arrives to see
the attack and runs away to lock out the contaminated compartment with the students, stating on
his radio to the conductor that violence has erupted in the train.
The description of zombie outbreak as violence or protest is a common theme in the film.
It also features prominently in Seoul Station where the zombie outbreak is described as a violent
protest by the homeless. In the animation, the military fire at panicked survivors chased by
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zombies. In Train, the news media on the train TV screens misreports the zombie attacks as
citizens’ uprising. The reports of violent and aggressive protestors allude to the protests in
Korean history. Numerous democratizers were arrested or imprisoned for protesting the military
dictators in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, the state was not afraid to use violence to
overpower the protestors. The fear of uprising clearly shows that a seemingly structured and
peaceful society is not far from the history of violence and fight for democracy.
The fact that train attendants are the first to contract the zombie virus further adds to the
film’s homage to the Sewol ferry incident as well as its problematization of Korean society. As
violence erupts in the back of the train, the first half of the train, including the first-class cars
where the main character sits, is still calm and peaceful. Riding the train to help the passengers,
the two attendants become the main source of the zombie virus. The chief attendant who runs
away from the students’ compartment parallels the Sewol ferry captain who abandoned the ship
and the passengers to save himself. The captain and the crew of the Sewol ferry were one of the
first to abandon ship and get rescued while the public announcement on the ship repeatedly
instructed passengers to stay put. Having been told to sit and wait for rescue, the students on the
Sewol ferry were essentially trapped in the ship as it slowly sank while the captain and his crew
safely reached the shore. The film more vividly sets the scene of entrapment: the clear window
on the compartment door shows students scream and pound on the locked compartment door.
Behind them, their friends are attacked, murdered, and turned into zombies. No adult opens the
door to let them out.
The number of surviving students dwindle as the film progresses until there are two
students left. The two get separated in the commotion: the female student Jin-Hee (Sohee) hides
in a zombie-free compartment with other survivors including Yong-suk (Kim Eui-sung), an
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authoritative and selfish CEO who insists on locking out everyone outside the compartment in
fear of contamination. Yong-guk (Choi Woo-shik), the male student on the baseball team, fights
his way along with the main character Seok Woo (Gong Yoo) and others to arrive outside the
safe compartment. Yong-guk and others, chased by zombies, try to get into the compartment but
Yong-suk refuses to open the door, claiming that one of the survivors could be bitten. Jin-Hee
hears Yong-guk’s voice and attempts to open the door but other surviving adults, convinced by
Yong-suk, start to voice the need to keeping the door locked even though it is clear that this
would mean certain death for those outside the compartment.
When Yong-guk manages to slide his arm in the door, Yong-suk and the others try to
break Yong-guk’s arm to keep the doors locked. When that fails and Seok Woo and the others
manage to get into the safe car, the people occupying the compartment berate them to move onto
the next compartment so they could lock themselves up again. They are not willing to work
together because they do not want to risk any of them lying about being infected. Yong-guk
walks on, telling Jin-Hee to stay in the safe compartment but she goes with him. She refuses,
saying that the safe compartment is “scarier.” Her words emphasize the fact that this zombie-free
compartment full of self-centered adults is more terrifying than a possibly zombie-infested rest
of the train.
Jin-Hee’s words prove to be correct when Yong-suk runs towards her and Yong-guk at
the end, chased by a zombie, and throws Jin-Hee to the ground in order to escape the zombie.
Yong-suk’s sense of entitlement about his own survival at the expense of others causes the end
of Jin-Hee’s life, and by extension Yong-guk’s, as he loses all will to fight and lets Jin-Hee bite
him. In this scene Yong-suk is the epitome of selfish adults that cause the death of the innocent.
In the next section I discuss more in detail about the stark contrast between the authoritative
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patriarch represented by Yong-suk as selfish and uncaring and a new masculine man who
protects all the socially weak.

Adults in the Film and the Myth of Masculinity – Yong-Suk, Seok Woo, and Sang Hwa
As discussed in the previous chapter, the myth of masculinity changes with time and
shifting political ideologies. Immediately after Japanese colonialism, the ideal masculine is a
powerful leader. Modeled after Park Chung-hee, the myth evolves as an all-knowing patriarch
who defends his family and guides them to success. However, the financial crisis and increasing
demand for democracy becomes a turning point in which the myth distances itself from an
oppressive patriarchy. Films reflect the evolution by casting unreasonable and aggressive
patriarchs as villains and juxtaposing them against a new ideal masculine man who protects all
that are weak and oppressed. The new masculinity does not claim omnipotence and omniscience
but listens to formerly silenced voices. This change does not indicate a change in women’s
objectification. The new myth of masculinity is still based on an male-centered experience and
aftermath of trauma, while women are seen as objects belonging to the men and needing
protection.
There are three male characters in Train to Busan: the aforementioned Yong-suk, Seok
Woo (Gong Yoo), and Sang Hwa (Ma Dong-seok). Yong-suk represents the authoritative and
selfish older generation. He introduces himself as the CEO of Stallion Express and relies on his
social status to emphasize his importance even as the social order breaks down around him.
Yong-suk believes that his success depends solely on his abilities. He sees a homeless man and
correlates the man’s poverty with personal failure, assuming his status is due to his not trying
hard enough. Yong-suk points to the homeless man and tells Soo-an that she will turn out to be
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like the homeless man if she does not study hard at school. Moreover, he shoves others at the
zombies in order to escape himself. Even when he uses Jin-Hee, a high school student, as a
human shield, he justifies himself with the words, “I need to go,” implying that he is more
important than anyone else. He represents the authoritative patriarch, the old masculine that the
myth now abandons for a more up-to-date myth of masculinity that we see in Sang Hwa, a loving
husband and a new father-to-be.
Sang Hwa is the morally upright and protective man who cares about not just his wife
Sung Gyeong (Jung Yu-mi) and unborn child but also everyone else. He is the new kind of
masculine patriarch who guards the bathroom door for his wife and guides everyone to safety in
a dire situation. He is violent, but his violence is justified and even celebrated because he uses it
to fight zombies and help survivors. Seeing Soo-an about to be attacked by a zombified soldier
(and not within reach of her father Seok Woo), Sang Hwa elbows the zombie and fights off
another to save her. Sang Hwa and Sung Gyeong grab Soo-an and run to safety. About to lock
the door, Sang Hwa sees the homeless man half running and half limping and Seok Woo frozen
in fear, and waits for them instead of locking the door right away. His actions that risk his own
safety in the interest of helping others contrasts directly to that of Yong-suk’s in the next scene
where Yong-suk tries to convince the crew to start the train despite the fact that other survivors
are still on the platform. Towards the beginning Seok Woo also resembles Yong-Suk who
selfishly focuses on his own comfort and well-being.
The main character Seok Woo goes through a transformation in the film from an
authoritative and selfish father to a new version of the masculine ideal who considers other
people. In the beginning of the film, Seok Woo is a self-centered man who built his economic
success on collecting insider information. He does not have the time to attend his daughter’s
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recitals, and he forgets what presents he had gotten her previously. Heading to Busan where he
can drop off Soo-an with his ex-wife, Seok Woo’s main concern is returning to the office by
lunch time.
When the zombies start attacking, Seok Woo’s sole concern is his and Soo-an’s survival
– because Soo-an is his daughter. His behavior in the beginning is contrasted with Sang Hwa’s
who struggles to rescue a woman from a biting zombie. In contrast, Seok Woo quickly walks by
as Sang Hwa struggles with the zombie, trying not to get in their way or make eye contact. Once
in the first-class compartment where Yong-Suk and the others are, Seok Woo looks back and
sees Sung Gyeong and Sang Hwa running towards the compartment, chased by zombies. People
scream for Seok Woo to block the door as he is standing closest to the door; Seok Woo sees the
couple, hesitates, but shuts the door in Sung Gyeong’s face. At that moment, Seok Woo is only
interested in looking after himself and his daughter, still governed by the hurried lifestyle that
prioritizes productivity and self-interest over communal good.
Seeing Yong-suk talk on the phone about Daejeon Station, Seok Woo calls one of his
analysts located in Daejeon to confirm that the station is safe. His contact tells him that anyone
who gets to the station will be quarantined by the military, and Seok Woo says, “How about just
helping me and my daughter?” and bargains for safety with good insider information. The
contact tells Seok Woo to take his daughter and come out the Eastern Square instead of the Main
Square. At the station, Seok Woo takes Soo-an to a restricted area of the station without sharing
this vital information with the others who get on the escalator to exit the station towards the
Main Square. Seok Woo is aware that other people are heading towards military quarantine and
other dangers, but he still does not inform anyone else. The escalator slowly descends towards
the ground when the passengers realize that the figures in military uniforms outside the station
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have been infected. The military that should have protected the citizens becomes a direct threat
to the survivors.
Seok Woo starts to change when he sees the social system collapse at Daejeon Station.
When Soo-an offers her seat to a grandma towards before they reach Daejeon, Seok Woo
criticizes her for not looking after her own interests in such time of chaos. But his understanding
of what the right thing to do changes throughout the film. Impacted by both his morally
incorruptible daughter and Sang Hwa, who insist on helping everyone because it is the right
thing to do, Seok Woo thinks about protecting all survivors. He uses his power and violence to
protect those in need even if it does not benefit him personally. Only then does Soo-an recognize
Seok Woo as a good person and a good father, not the person she accused of selfishness in the
beginning of the film. Seok Woo becomes a new masculine man, distinguishing himself from the
villainous and unchanging authoritarian Yong-suk.
By the end of the film, a contrast between Seok Woo and Yong-suk depicts how much
Seok Woo has changed. When bitten, Yong-suk is in denial, refusing to take any responsibility
or face the situation. Selfish to the end, he repeats that he is scared until he turns and attacks the
other characters. In contrast, Seok Woo gets bitten while protecting his daughter and Sung
Gyeong. Wasting no time, he checks the brakes of the locomotives before leaping to his death
before he can hurt them as a zombie. When the social order that demands productive and selfish
workers crumbles, Seok Woo reconnects with humanity even as he changes into a zombie.

The “Woman Problem”: Still Neglected?
By the release of Train to Busan, the myth of masculinity had adapted to a changing
Korean culture. First, the myth of masculinity celebrates the omnipotent and omniscient patriarch
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who fiercely protects his family. This myth that emerges from the trauma of domination dictates
that the masculine violence is justified when protecting his “possessions” from outsiders.
However, the IMF Crisis triggers a question of what is neglected when modernization and
economic gain become prioritized over all else. Because of shifting political winds, the myth has
to change to accommodate a new model of masculinity where the patriarch not only protects his
own family, but also those who are less powerful. As such, the new myth of masculinity justifies
violence as social good. When Sang Hwa and Seok Woo bashes the skulls of zombies to protect
their wife and daughter respectively, the violence is wholeheartedly welcomed. On the other
hand, when Yong-suk shoves high school students to save himself, his violence is interpreted as
selfish, unjust, and evil.
But the myth of masculinity, however updated, still obscures women’s subjectivity. In
other words, the new masculine, however morally upright and selfless in his new dedication to
the weak, still sees women as weak entities that need his protection. Most notably, in Train to
Busan there are three female characters: Jin-Hee, the high school student, Sung Gyeong the
pregnant woman, and Soo-an. The three are presented as needing protection because they are
weak but also valuable – they represent the future generation – and therefore must be protected
by the men.
Jin-Hee becomes Yong-guk’s reason for survival as Yong-guk tries to emerge as the
masculine man but ultimately fails when Jin-Hee gets bitten. Jin-Hee travels with Yong-guk for
the majority of the film. Trapped in an unmoving train, Yong-guk grabs an emergency hammer
and attempts to break the glass on the locked door. Jin-Hee stands behind him unable to help. At
that moment, Yong-suk runs toward them with a zombie trailing behind him and uses Jin-Hee as
a human shield. Yong-guk tries to help Jin-Hee but she is already convulsing on the floor with a
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bite mark on her leg. Up until the moment, Yong-guk is eager to escape the situation with JinHee, protecting her from the zombies. But when Jin-Hee is bitten, he appears to lose all interest
in survival. Instead of running he holds her until she turns and bites him on the neck. Using the
myth of masculinity, I interpret this scene as Yong-guk recognizing his failure to be the
masculine man because he failed to protect the girl in his charge. He has failed to protect his girl
(Jin-Hee) from the external dangers (zombies, Yong-suk) and therefore he has failed to emerge
as the masculine.
Sung Gyeong and Soo-an are the two that survive until the end. When Sang Hwa is bitten
on his hand, he decides to sacrifice his life so that other survivors including his wife can run to
safety at the other end of the compartment. Knowing that he will soon turn into a zombie, he
sends everyone running while holding onto the door for a bit longer. One last time he turns to
Sung Gyeong and names his unborn daughter. The death is tragic yet also triumphant as he
struggles until the very end to ensure that Sung Gyeong and the baby stay alive. Not only did
Sang Hwa protect his woman, but he also preserved the next generation in the form of his unborn
daughter.
Soo-an’s (and Sung Gyeong’s) survival is attributed to Seok Woo. When zombified
Yong-suk tries to jump on Sung Gyeong and Soo-an, Seok Woo places his hand over Yong-suk’s
mouth to provide a barrier between them. Throwing zombified Yong-suk off the locomotive he
says goodbye to Soo-an and locks himself outside the control room where Soo-an continues to
cry. A prolonged sequence ensues with melodramatic background music. Seok Woo also starts
crying bitterly, but his cries subside when he remembers holding a newborn Soo-an. Rapidly
transforming into a zombie, Seok Woo dies smiling with the image of Soo-an as a baby because
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he had done all he could to protect his daughter and Sung Gyeong. He has successfully
procreated and protected the next generation.
This scene is often described (and even criticized) for being melodramatic. Such mixing
of genres is quite uncommon in Hollywood films. Melodrama, however, remains the
predominant narrative mode in Korean cinema.180 Various genres including action, horror, and
others typically include melodramatic scenes to tie the story together. The tradition derives from
the Japanese theatrical style called Shinpa that focused on melodramatic plots and social critique
of the class structure.
Shinpa connotes tragic tales of romance and female suffering, defeatist narratives with
inevitably sad endings, designed as quintessential ‘tear jerkers.’ So influential is the
melodramatic mode in Korean cinema that its narrative qualities frequently emerge in
horror.181
As a precursor to melodrama, Japanese films influenced heavily by Shinpa were distributed
throughout Korea where consumers preferred the melodramatic narrative. In Japanese film
history, Shinpa referred to the modern drama as opposed to the kyūha or period drama.182
Influenced by Japanese Shinpa, Shinpa films in Korea also focused on modern drama and
characteristics such as tragic love.183 Seo In-sook argues that the use of Shinpa films contributed
to both the political and ideological control over Korea and aided in establishing Korea as a
marketplace for Japanese products.184 It is, therefore, ironic that modern Korean films are known
for combining melodrama with various genres. It raises the question of discrepancy between the
visible and violent masculine response to colonialism while incorporating cultural aspects of
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Japanese film into Korean ones. The phenomenon serves as yet another reminder that culture
does not exist in a vacuum – postcolonial culture and identity is undeniably influenced by and
intertwined with colonialism.
The melodramatic scene featuring Seok Woo delivers the message that male value
derives from protecting the weak. The new myth of masculinity still celebrates male violence as
necessary when it is used to protect his home, his women, his objects. In such equation, women
are still depicted as “objects” that need to be protected by these men.

Conclusion
Post financial crisis, the masculine is not an authoritative father-figure who knows
everything; instead, the new masculine is benevolent and helpful, concerned with not only his
own family but also the public good. In the film Yong-suk commands people to lock doors,
seemingly knowing what he is talking about. But in the end, he is only concerned about his own
survival, and he would gladly sacrifice any number of others for it. The new masculine, Sang
Hwa and Seok Woo, sacrifice themselves to protect others, and their violence is justified because
they are working for the safety of everyone.
While these new masculine figures save the day, the myth of masculinity perpetuates the
same problem as it had before: there is no room for women’s subjective experience. The sole
survivors of the film represent reproductive futurity: Soo-an, a female child, and pregnant Sung
Gyeong. Although the military government guards the entrance to Busan, ready to shoot any
zombies, it immediately stands down to care for Soo-an and Sung Gyeong. Perhaps the
government has gone through the same transformation as Seok Woo through the zombie
outbreak: care and protection must be prioritized over economic development.
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Train to Busan is Yeon’s critique of modern Korean culture as well as a fantasy of how
the world might be different if there had been more masculine heroes such as Sang Hwa or Seok
Woo. In reality, Korean culture supports an extreme competition among individuals for limited
resources. Individual success is often prioritized over caring for others or the social good. Recent
Korean shows such as Squid Game illustrate this volatile and fierce contention. Individuals try to
achieve personal growth through stability, especially after the financial crisis during which
Koreans experienced firsthand what lack of economic stability can do to individuals. The
beautiful tale of how Koreans worked together and overcame the “IMF crisis” is shattered by the
aftermath of everyone competing for most stability for themselves.
When the 2014 Sewol ferry tragedy occurred, many Koreans realized the shocking truth:
Korea’s embrace of neoliberal ideology and overemphasis on economic success has led to a
neglect of other important factors such as safety and morality. A ferry captain abandoned the
ship and saved himself first; a shipping company overloaded the ferry for additional profit;
maritime police wasted precious time for rescuing because they had not trained properly. While
these individuals certainly deserve blame and punishment, the Sewol incident is not a direct
result of a handful of irresponsible and morally corrupt individuals. The real problem is a
structural one in which companies spend the minimum amount of money on non-profitable
necessities such as employee training.185 Banners at the Paengmok Harbor still exist, asking
“What did the police do?” or “Why didn’t you save my child.”186
Train to Busan is a fantasy of what might have happened if there had been more
masculine men at the Paengmok Harbor during the 2014 incident. If men such as Sang Hwa or
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Seok Woo had been there, they might have protected the students. They might all be well and
alive now. In that sense, the film is both a commentary on the disaster and a form of wish
fulfillment. The adults who had failed the high school students have now also found a way to
save the next generation, just as it happens at the end of the film. When zombies negate the
established social and political structures, it is easier to distinguish what is really important, and
that is humans. “People come first,” as the new Korean government slogan states since the 2017
regime change.
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Chapter 4 Dangerous Women and the Myth of Masculinity: A Return to the Original
National Trauma
In the previous chapters, I have discussed the myth of masculinity and its evolution in
Korean films. As I have explained, the myth of masculinity is founded upon a male subjective
understanding and recreating of national trauma. In other words, the myth of masculinity focuses
on the development of a strong male persona to prevent another national plunder. The problem
arises when the myth of masculinity’s heavy emphasis on male identity as a national one
neglects to consider the female experience and understanding of national trauma. While both
men and women experienced colonialism, the myth of masculinity’s focus on male subjective
experience co-opts women’s experience, especially ones of sexual nature, as a part of male
trauma. The myth of masculinity urges violence from men because their nation, their houses, and
their things have been taken. Women are simply one of these objects that needs masculine
protection. Women’s experience is submerged within the male trauma.
The myth of masculinity leaves out women’s subjectivity, meaning women are seen as
objects to be protected by justifiable male violence against outside influence. Such an equation
leads to another important question: not all women “want” protection. What happens to those
who cannot be protected by the masculine men? One insidious outcome of the prevalence of the
myth of masculinity and its disregard for female subjectivity is that women are divided into
“acceptable” and “unacceptable” groups to further legitimize the myth.
The “acceptable” women are the ones that fit into the masculine understanding of women
as needing male protection. These “good” women are safe from the national Other, sexually and
otherwise, because the masculine have used and continues to use necessary violence to protect
them. The protection of these women provides a justification for the violence of the masculine
men. Such objectification of women is not confined to the myth of masculinity or even the
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Korean nation. However, the unique combination of the lasting effects of Confucianism and
historical domination in Korea has rendered objectification of women as harmless and even
desirable.
On the other hand, the “bad” women are the ones that exist outside male protection –
whether by choice or not. In the context of masculinity “bad” women are read as sexually
promiscuous. In the context of post-liberation Korea, comfort women – most of whom had been
tricked or forced into sex slavery against their will – were silenced because they had been
sexually violated by the national Other; here, the Japanese. Their trauma was interpreted as a
national humiliation to men under the myth of masculinity because the men were not strong
enough to protect their women. When Korean society finally acknowledged comfort women in
late 1990s, these women were exclusively framed as lost “virgins” and “grandmothers” to imply
their willingness to have been “good” women protected by the masculine men. However, the
other group of “bad” women – the sex workers at U.S. military camps – did not fit the frame of
masculine understanding of women. Therefore, they were promoted as unacceptable and evil
despite the fact that they played a significant role in U.S.-Korean relations.
Park Chung-hee’s regime worked to keep the alliance between Korea and the United
States. In order to procure the U.S. military’s stay, Park reinforced policies that oppressed the
camptown prostitutes, also known as kijich’on (military camp kiji and village ch’on combined to
form one word) sex workers, including mandatory check-ups for venereal diseases, frequent reregistration processes, and involuntary penicillin shots. It is important to mention that the U.S.
soldiers were not subject to such processes.
Just as the comfort women were a product of Japanese government, the Korean
government used the small group of powerless women with no social standing in Korea to
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provide “comfort” for the U.S. soldiers and ensure a safe environment for the “good” Korean
women and daughters. The phrase “comfort women,” initially referring to women forced into
sexual slavery for the Japanese military in the ‘40s, is sometimes used to refer to postcolonial
Korean sex workers servicing the U.S. military as well. To avoid confusion, I will employ the
term “comfort women” to address victims during Japanese colonialism and kijich’on sex workers
to refer to post-colonial U.S. military camptown workers. The distinction helps clarify the
fundamentally different positions these two groups of women occupy in the popular media and
its discourse.
The phrase “comfort woman” (ianfu) evokes a sense of victimhood that is specifically
related to girlhood. This sense of victimhood is related to the loss of country and agency during
the Japanese colonialism. That sense of “no choice” does not extend to people who have to sell
sex for livelihood. The victimhood does not extend to the loss of choice through poverty or
systemic sexism and therefore kijich’on workers are not part of the understanding of victims.
For example, one of the most famous monuments to comfort women during Japanese
colonialism, The Statue of Peace, features a teenage girl.187 The statue was first unveiled on
December 4, 2011 to mark former comfort women’s 1000th weekly demonstration in front of the
Japanese embassy.188 The bronze statue features a young girl sitting on a chair, gazing forward
with little emotion showing on her face. She has short straight hair and is dressed in traditional
Korean attire with bare feet. Behind her is a shadow of an old woman, hinting at the passage of
time. The empty chair beside her symbolizes the victims who are no longer here to protest.
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Dongho Chun, an Art History scholar, writes that the visual representation of comfort women as
a humble young girl successfully evokes a sense of vulnerability, fragility, and gullibility in the
viewer.189 Chun illuminates the sculpting process in his article, stating that the husband-and-wife
sculptors worked on the artwork together. He notes that the wife came up with the visualization
of comfort women as a young girl in her miniature clay prototype because she envisioned most
comfort women being teenagers when they were first recruited.190 While Chun argues that the
sculptor’s imagination results from comfort women’s own insistence on their physical and
mental innocence, I believe that both the imagination and comfort women’s perspectives are
deeply influenced by the myth of masculinity that dictates ways in which former comfort women
are rendered acceptable in popular imagination.

In the first part of this chapter I elaborate on the relationship between the myth of
masculinity and the sexuality of women in Korea. Since I have located the beginning of the myth
to be in Japanese colonialism, I begin by examining women during the domination. In particular,
I focus on some Korean women who were forced to or tricked into servicing the Japanese
military as “comfort women.” Comfort women, severely mistreated by the Japanese military,
continue to suffer even after the liberation under the myth of masculinity that oppresses them and
prevents them from voicing their trauma.
The film I analyze for this section is Spirits’ Homecoming (Dir. Cho Jung-rae 2016), a
commercially successful film that engages with the issue of comfort women. The film
accentuates the myth of masculinity and its positioning of comfort women as victims: the film
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features one former comfort woman in her old age looking back at her youth. But the portrayal
lacks the on-going aspects of their trauma including poverty.
In the second part of the chapter I examine U.S. military camptown prostitutes after the
Korean War (1950-3). South Korea formed an alliance with the U.S. and U.S. military camps
were set up in various locations including Dongducheon, Uijeongbu, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu
and other cities. Since the Korean War there are more than twenty thousand US troops
permanently stationed in Korea.191 Often the residential and commercial districts surrounding
these camptowns known as kijich’on have a distinctive neighborhood character from the rest of
the city they are located in. Some apartment complexes are reserved exclusively for military
personnel and certain restaurants cater to the non-Korean soldiers.
Itaewon, a commercial district within Yongsan District in Seoul, is an example of a
former camptown developed initially to accommodate the U.S. military at Yongsan Garrison
which closed as of 2019. The majority of the troops have relocated to newly built Camp
Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and the transfer will be complete this year in 2022.192 The garrison
had first been created by the Japanese imperial army during colonialism where the area was not
yet fully developed. The area had been a military stronghold for Japanese until 1945 when U.S.
24th Army Corps took over.193 The surrounding area progressed as a camptown with restaurants,
bars, and entertainment targeted specifically at the soldiers. When Yongsan Garrison first set up
in Itaewon, the district initially developed to both entertain and contain the U.S. influence.
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Itaewon was exempted from the Anti-Sexual Corruption Law of 1961 that illegalized prostitution
because sex work had become one of the biggest industries during the ‘60s:194
A complete eradication of the sex industry next to the US bases was clearly neither in the
interest of the USA nor of the Korean authorities, with economic calculations playing an
important role on the South Korean part: Park Chung-Hee, who had come into power
through a coup in 1961, was looking for ways to amass the foreign currency so urgency
needed to fuel the devastated economy. The hustling of women to the Americans in
neighborhoods such as Itaewon proved a goldmine in this respect.195
The “hustling” was limited to designated neighborhoods as any sex work in non-military towns
was illegal. Ironically, for the rest of the nation, Park Chung-hee emphasized the evils of
American, Western, and Japanese things that corroded the national spirit.196 The U.S. camptowns
were a necessary evil that he intended to contain. Such active containment added further stigma
to kijich’on sex workers who existed between the U.S. soldiers and the “respectable” Korean
women.
As Itaewon neighborhood further developed and gentrified, Yongsan District became a
part of central Seoul. Since 2004, the Korean government worked with the United States to
relocate troops from the heart of the city. Camp Humphreys was built in Pyeongtaek – with
Korean government funding 90 percent of the $11 billion in construction – and the relocation
process began in 2018.197 The visages of camptown still remain in the alleyways of Itaewon
including streets unofficially named “Hooker Hill” and “Homo Hill.”198
The film I discuss in this section is The Bacchus Lady (Dir. E J-yong 2016), which more
clearly addresses poverty as an issue compared to Spirits’ Homecoming. The film examines a
dire lack of choice for a stigmatized former kijich’on sex worker. Rather than examining military
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sex work from a safe distance by rendering it separate from the main character’s current being,
the film engages with the reality of continued poverty by featuring an active sex worker in her
old age.

Comfort Women During Japanese Colonialism
The myth of masculinity leaves little room for female subjectivity because masculine
understanding of women as objects leads to an over-generalized categorization of women into
socially acceptable and unacceptable groups. Objectification of women within the myth of
masculinity assumes that women belong to male subjects, and hence have no desires that exist
separately from the male subject. For the masculine subject, women’s sexuality becomes a
commodity.
Immediately following the liberation, women who had experienced sexual violence,
especially at the hands of a national Other, were encouraged to stay quiet to “protect” not only
themselves but also their families. At the same time, national discourse actively discouraged the
discussion of comfort women:
National discourses excluded issues that called attention to the humiliation on the
national level, and the issue of comfort women was a typical example. When first
attempts were made to publicize comfort women governmental and male responses were
consistent. They considered the attempt an act that refreshed national disgrace, a
traitorous deed. The reaction is based on the idea that women’s bodies belong to the
patriarch, and that the violation of these objects by an Other disgraces the patriarch.199
The treachery was women choosing to discuss the trauma from a subjective position. To
reiterate, the myth of masculinity assumes men to be the subjects while women are objectified.
Therefore, the victims of comfort stations function as a reminder of the humiliation of
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domination under masculinity. The main focus of shame for the masculine is the humiliation that
the male self feels when a stronger subject (Japan) takes his object (women) by force. With this
focus in mind under the myth of masculinity, the women’s subjective experiences become tales
of national disgrace. Contrary to the goal of masculinity which aims to conceal the trauma, the
discussion of felt trauma from women exposes the open wound. Under the myth of masculinity,
these women, victims of violation, exist as objects that once needed protection (naïve virgins and
grandmothers) who now remind the masculine how they failed in the past.
Given this role that comfort women play, it is not surprising that the issue of military
comfort women came to light only when a survivor came forward decades later. Kim Hak-Soon
was only able to publicly describe her experience at the Council for the Issue of Comfort Stations
of Korean Women’s Associations United in 1991. Her statement alarmed the Korean
government that had ignored the issue of Japanese military sex slavery in various negotiations
with the Japanese government including the Korea-Japan bilateral treaty in 1965.200 The Korean
government eventually acquiesced to providing a monthly welfare allowance for the former
comfort women.201
There are multiple reasons why the issue of comfort women did not come to light until
almost 50 years after the colonialism. On an individual level, Kim felt that she could now talk
since her husband and children died. In Asian culture, one is not only bringing shame to oneself
when sharing about potentially embarrassing experiences, but this shame is taken on collectively
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as a family unit.202 Without a family that would suffer over her past experiences, Kim felt free to
voice her “shameful” experience as a victim. It was very difficult for former comfort women to
speak up about their experiences. Many felt the pressure from their own families and relatives to
not talk about the “shameful” experiences lest they bring shame on the whole family. One former
comfort woman Kim Soon-Duk recalls how she was too ashamed to return to her family even
after she arrived back in Korea. She did not reveal her experiences to her common-law husband
and only came forward three months after his death.203 Another woman, Kim Hak-Soon, took
legal action against the Japanese government after both her husband and her children died.204
There are two major reasons stated for the “need” of comfort stations during the Japanese
colonialism: to stop the spread of venereal disease and prevent the rape of local women. After
colonialism, these exact reasons are stated to establish brothels in U.S. military camps stationed
in Korea. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a Japanese history scholar, recounts the establishment of comfort
stations by the Japanese military government, arguing that the Japanese military comfort stations
established in Shanghai in 1931 were planned based on the Japanese army’s experience of
Siberia from 1918 to 1922. Yoshiaki claims that the documentation suggest that many soldiers
who returned from Siberia were infected with sexually transmitted diseases from the local
brothels. He writes that “the Japanese army would not allow troops to use civilian brothels in
order to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. It considered the creation of comfort
stations managed by the army to be a suitable alternative.”205 The problem, according to
Yoshiaki, was that the comfort stations did not prevent the spread of diseases because while
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comfort women were regularly tested by the army doctors, military personnel were not subjected
to scrutiny or follow-up tests.206 The testing was a form of oppression and sexual shaming for the
women, and did little to actually prevent the spread of diseases.
The second reason stated for the “need” for comfort stations was to prevent the rape of
local women. Many local women in various areas of China were raped by the soldiers occupying
or passing through, and the Japanese set up comfort stations in fear of civilian revolt:
With the goal of preventing rapes, we find that there were no occupied areas in which
rapes stopped. […] The introduction of comfort station system did little to prevent rapes
from occurring. The comfort station system was a system of officially recognized sexual
violence that victimized particular women and trampled upon their human rights.
(Yoshiaki 66)
The comfort station system was created partly with the intention of preventing rapes of local
women – not for the local women’s sake but to protect the Japanese army.
Comfort women consisted of many nationalities, even Japanese; the key difference was
that there were stricter regulations to abide by when recruiting Japanese comfort women.
Yoshiaki notes that Japanese comfort women were limited to sex workers over the age of
twenty-one.207 In one rounding up of women Yoshiaki notes that “while all of the Japanese were
working as prostitutes, all of the Korean girls are said to have been tricked into going along”
(Yoshiaki 102). To the Japanese army, Korean girls and Japanese sex workers were equally
expendable for their “comfort.”208
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One of the reasons why so many Korean girls were tricked into becoming comfort
women is due to the oppression they already experienced from their families in Korea. While
most girls were from poorer families, even girls from well-to-do families were lured by the
prospect of education and independence. Rampant gender discrimination against women often
limited girls from getting formal education. They were frequently denied opportunities to earn
skills to support themselves and agents took advantage of these girls’ feelings of oppression.209
Other girls were kidnapped and provided necessary documents by the local police.
Because the government was directly involved with the military processes, the local law
enforcement easily and quickly complied with the military needs:
First, consulates in each region of China conveyed the request of the army units in their
jurisdictions to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry would then send these
requests on to the Overseas Affairs Ministry, which would inform the GovernmentGeneral of Korea. From the Government-General, these requests would be passed down
to police departments and then on to provincial governors and police chiefs.210
The process involved different sectors of the government, contrary to Japan’s formal claim that
the military was not responsible in the running of individual brothels.
Japan’s claim implied both that the Japanese government was not responsible for the
comfort women and that most, if not all, comfort women were willing sex workers. The response
from the Korean government did not help the former comfort women either; the women were
made to feel shame for what had been done to them and forced to keep silent. In a structure that
mirrors the masculine, the women were doubly bound by colonial law and nationalist sentiment.
Former comfort women were not provided for by the government until the mid-1990s,
and even then, they lived in poverty. Furthermore, many did not get support from their families
because they never returned to them after colonialism ended. One survivor, Hwang Geum-Joo,
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confessed that she did not try to find her family or tell anyone what happened due to shame.211
Although many including Hwang were able to come forward after Kim Hak-Soon’s public
interview, the issue is far from resolved. Even when politicians recognized the issue and made
public promises, they were not always prioritized. Hwang recalls how former President Kim Dae
Jung, elected in 1998, had promised to resolve the comfort women issue. “That Kim Dae Jung…
he promised that the first thing he would do as president was to resolve the comfort women
issue. That son of a bitch didn’t do anything. I had lunch with him. He promised.”212 Many
former comfort women still live in neglect and poverty.
Eventually, the Korean government started subsidizing housing as well as providing a
limited amount of social benefits for former comfort women in 1993, almost five decades after
the liberation:
In total, two hundred twelve elderly women in Korea have contacted the hotline, but
according to activists, there are many more that have chosen to remain silent. This
triggered the Korean government, which had been silent on Japanese military sex slavery,
even during the negotiations with the Japanese government for the Korea-Japan bilateral
treaty in 1965 that settled war issues, to eventually begin giving these women a monthly
welfare allowance.213
After the early 2000s, comfort women had become an open social issue. Today, Koreans
generally acknowledge the fact that comfort women are victims and that the Japanese
government during colonialism is directly responsible for their abuse. However, the former sex
slaves are desexualized to serve as a symbol of loss for the masculine. The comfort women in
media are depicted only as innocent young girls or “grandmothers” that are removed from
sexuality or desire to render them “acceptable” for the masculine understanding of women as
needing protection.
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Films and Representation of Comfort Women
The historical context of comfort women renders the topic important yet difficult to
depict in films. The myth of masculinity adds to the general reluctance to acknowledge comfort
women’s experiences during colonialism because it indicates how Korean men have failed to
protect their women from the Japanese. As a result, comfort women in media are typically
depicted only as young girls or old women, both desexualized.
One particular example I want to discuss is the film Spirits’ Homecoming (Dir. Cho Jungrae 2016). Produced by JO Entertainment that focuses on traditional Korean content often based
on history and distributed by Connect Pictures that specializes in art films, Spirits’ Homecoming
was able to finish filming through crowd funding. More than 75 thousand people funded around
$960,000 USD and popular phrases used to promote the film included “A film that Korean
citizens made.”214 Despite the implied pride at how far Korean society has come to be able to
discuss such matters in a film that was available at theaters, not everyone perceived the film as a
positive change. Song Gyeongwon, a Korean film journalist for Cine21, writes, and I translate,
that the film has merits for revisiting fading voices of the old comfort women. However, he
argues that the trauma should be dealt in a more delicate and thorough manner instead of
oversimplifying it by incorporating unnecessary settings, excessive spectacle, and binary
perspectives to create dramatic tension in the film.215 Song recognizes that this film is a good

214
Siwoo Jung, “Spirits’ Homecoming that Deals with Comfort Women, Completed with the Support of
More than 70,000 Citizens, Opens on February 24,” Ten Asia, Ten Asia, January 19, 2016,
https://tenasia.hankyung.com/topic/article/2016011928094.
215
Gyeongwon Song, “Disappointing because Necessary. Nevertheless,” Spirits’ Homecoming Naver
Films, Naver, accessed April 4, 2022, https://movie.naver.com/movie/bi/mi/point.naver?code=135843.

99

start, but we ultimately need more films on this subject matter to justly represent the voices that
had been silenced for so long.
The film alternates between the “now” in the late 1990s and the “past” in the 1940s. In
the present, an unnamed older woman who makes traditional Korean clothes (hanbok)
encounters a young rape victim residing at her friend’s house. The friend is a shaman and the
young girl, who is psychically gifted, starts communicating with the spirits of the dead people.
The hanbok maker reminisces about the 1940s where a fourteen-year-old girl named Jung-min
plays in the woods. Her family is very poor but loves their only daughter. One day, Japanese
soldiers take her from her home to a comfort station, leaving her parents wailing helplessly in the
background. The film focuses heavily on the terror of the girl’s experience at the comfort station
along with many other young girls. Audiences assume that Jung-min is the hanbok maker in the
present, until back in the present the hanbok maker and the young rape victim visit the village
that Jung-min grew up in. The young rape victim channeled the spirit of Jung-min, and in a twist
the audiences find out that the hanbok maker is Jung-min’s friend (a background character
during the flashback portion of the film) and that Jung-min died back in the comfort station. The
two characters’ spirits reunite through the young girl acting as a vessel, and both girls are finally
able to “return” home.
The film is deservedly celebrated for tackling the difficult issue of comfort women based
on actual accounts of survivors. Despite its attempt, the film has some problematic aspects that
overlook the problems of poverty that prevail long after colonialism. The film’s use of Korean
shamanistic ritual (gut) implies that comfort women’s experiences are interchangeable.
Additionally, the film focuses solely on innocence of the fictional victims, failing to examine the
comfort women issue as a separate and on-going subjective experience of women.
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The use of a shaman ritual to resolve the conflict at the end of the film is problematic
because it oversimplifies the issue. First, it presents comfort women’s experiences as unitary and
interchangeable. Through the ritual the audience learns that the hanbok-maker is not Jung-min
but her friend, but the narrative does not change significantly because the hanbok-maker was
also at the comfort station with Jung-min. Neither the hanbok-maker’s parents nor home life is
featured in the film, but it is implied that Jung-min’s happy and peaceful life with her parents
prior to being taken by the Japanese soldiers pertains to most other girls at the comfort station.
This view is contradictory to many different accounts of former comfort women who have
varying narratives of why and how they became comfort women. Some were sold by their
parents while others volunteered, tricked into thinking that it was an opportunity to get an
education. Still others were looking for jobs to support their large families. Not all comfort
women had been happy and protected before the Japanese came along.
Furthermore, the Korean shamanistic ritual presents a self-Orientalized image of Korea as
static and incapable of change. Rituals are not a prevalent way of resolving conflict in modern
Korea. Yet, the ritual plays a significant role in the film as a mystical resolution of the suffering
for the two girls, Jung-min and the hanbok maker. The ritual unburdens the hanbok maker of
survivor’s guilt because Jung-min’s spirit has been delivered back to her hometown through the
ritual. Two different film journalists, Yoon Hyeji and Hwang Jinmi, describe the ritual in the
film as ssitgimgut, a specific ritual that cleanses the dead person’s soul so that they can safely
move on to the netherworld.216 The verb ssitgida means to wash. The implication is that the
hatred and sorrow that had been holding Jung-min’s spirit back is “washed away” through the
ritual because the hanbok maker reconciles with Jung-min’s spirit. While the idea nicely ends the
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film, reality is nowhere near as simple or easy. Former comfort women still protest the Japanese
in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea because the Japanese government refuses to
acknowledge comfort women’s experiences as war crimes. The Korean government provides the
bare minimum for these women, and only after the issue could no longer be silenced. Some
groups of Koreans criticize former comfort women as willing sex workers and protest for the
Peace Statue to be torn down for misrepresentation.217 While the film presents a beautiful
moment of self-reflection and acceptance, it completely overlooks the real-life impacts of
colonialism. The former comfort women are still living in poverty. No matter how emotional the
reconciliation between the two fictional characters is, it does not address the fact that some
survivors still live in shame and exile in real life.
The film also greatly emphasizes the innocence of young girls. One of the phrases
promoting the film was “What sent the young girls to hell?” Such emphasis reflects the ways in
which the survivors are framed as “grandmothers” (halmŏni) as a collective term to address
them. Soh critiques in her book on comfort women that:
What the common usage of the fictive kinship term “grandmother” for comfort women
survivors achieves paralinguistically is their social relocation and reclassification into
gendered but sexually inactive beings, highlighting their current status of being twice
removed generationally from the period of ordeals that their bodies—cast as sexual
commodities—endured during their adolescence and/or young adulthood. The cultural
symbolism of the term “grandmother” conveniently erases the actual feminine sexuality
of former comfort women, whose suffering was rooted in the very exploitation and
violation of their youthful sexual bodies. Their personal identity as individuals, which
had been obliterated under the euphemism ianfu [comfort women], is once again masked
under the term halmŏni, albeit with the good intention of expressing respect.218
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The use of the term “grandmother” aims to build a bond between the current generation and the
survivors, as in, “they could be any of our grandmothers.” Yet it also effectively desexualizes the
surviving women. Under the myth of masculinity that neglects women’s subjectivity, the
removal of sexuality effectively reinforces the notion that women’s sexuality (especially
virginity) is something to be protected – and once the masculine “fails” to protect it, it has no
place in the discourse. The general public initially rejected the term “sex slave” because the idea
of women in abject slavery hurt Koreans’ self-esteem and national pride.219 As Soh states, the
“causes of surviving victims’ lifelong sufferings are often more complex and divergent than the
nationalistic and transnational discourse of Japan’s comfort women phenomenon would suggest”
(59-60).220 The Korean media is not fully engaging with the lasting impacts of comfort women
issue when representing comfort women mostly as young girls of the past.
It is interesting to consider the contrast between the commercially successful Spirits’
Homecoming with the 1995 documentary The Murmuring by director Byeon Young-joo.221 The
Murmuring features former comfort women living in poverty. They protest in front of the city
hall for the Korean and Japanese government to recognize comfort women as an official issue—
and they feel a diverse range of emotions from empowerment to embarrassment. One survivor
claims that she had to protest despite the shame because Japan is claiming that this didn’t happen
when she is a victim and a witness. It was not governmental support or social welfare, but a
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fellow former comfort woman, Kim Hak-sun, that helped her come forward. For these women,
the past is not magically resolved through a shaman or a spirit but is an ongoing issue that affects
their daily lives. While it is important to feature the issue of comfort women in more films, it is
also important to remind people that this issue is an ongoing struggle for the survivors.
Comfort women are a direct result of Japanese domination. Yet discrimination against
women had existed within Korean social structures even before the domination. That is why
many young girls were lured by the promises of education and jobs, and that is why many
comfort women chose to stay behind in a foreign land rather than return to their home country
and families.222 The myth of masculinity dictates that comfort women are once-innocent bodies
that have been stolen by the national Other and uses the image to justify violence and aggression
of the masculine to protect such bodies. Such understanding removes these women from
subjecthood once again. Furthermore, the myth of masculinity dictates that if a woman rejects
protection from a man, they are “bad,” and kijich’on sex workers were labeled as “bad” women
for daring to support themselves and their families.

Kijich’on Sex Workers
After the liberation in 1945, the U.S.-(South)Korean alliance became an important part of
the newly forming economy in Korea. Continuing its presence from the 3-year U.S. military rule
from 1945 to 1948, the U.S. established military camps in various locations in South Korea.
During the first stages of U.S. military occupation, groups of women followed U.S. forces
offering to do laundry, run errands, or offer sex in exchange for money or other goods:223
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Prostitution has been illegal in the U.S. military, but in practice women's sexual service
has been viewed as an integral part of controlling the soldiers' sexual desires to contribute
to military efficiency. For reasons of national security and economic growth, military
prostitution in U.S. camp-towns has been tacitly accepted by the Korean government,
despite domestic prostitution being illegal since 1948.224
By 1955, the troops were permanently set up, forming U.S. military camptowns known as
kijich’on concentrating in the Paju area. Soh writes that Koreans coined new terms such as yanggalbo (Western whore) and, more euphemistically, yang-gongju (Western princess) to refer to
Korean women who performed sex work for the American military.225 U.S. camptowns became
an important source of income for post-war Korea. It is estimated that the troops contributed
25% of Korea’s GNP in the 1960s.226
The U.S.-Korean alliance was especially important to Park Chung-hee who came to
power after a military coup in 1961 and acted as the president of Korea until his assassination in
1979. Park Chung-hee’s regime focused on economic growth in Korea as well as military
protection from the U.S., and military bases became one of the major revenues in the early ‘60s.
Military towns or kijich’on were set up with specifically U.S.-catered restaurants, bars, and
prostitution.227
As U.S. military presence supported economic growth in Korea, the Korean government
supported the maintenance of the camptowns. Kijich’on amenities were open exclusively to U.S.
soldiers. One such support was “Clean-Up Process” that required regular tests from camptown
sex workers in an attempt to reduce venereal disease rates in U.S. soldiers in Korea. The
motivation for these tests were fundamentally for the health and comfort of U.S. servicemen, not
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the safety of women.228 If suspected of diseases, the women were forcefully taken to detention
facilities where they were inspected and given penicillin shots provided by the U.S. military.229
Many women suffered long-term effects, overdosed, or even died.230 The women had no choice
if they wanted to keep working, and they had to keep working to support themselves and even
their families:
The great majority of women who enter kijich’on prostitution have already experienced
severe deprivation and abuse – poverty, rape, repeated beatings by lovers or husbands.
The camp followers of the war era lived off their bodies and fed their family members
with their earnings. […] Poverty, together with low class status, has remained the primary
reason for women’s entry into camp-town prostitution from the 1950s to the mid1980s.231
The women were already victimized and ostracized before they joined the camptowns, and they
were further marginalized afterwards. What does this say about women’s worth determined by a
masculine social structure? Moon writes that kijich’on prostitutes were sacrificed in the name of
national wealth and stability. These women became readily available to a masculine society
because they were already considered “ruined” through their record of divorce, rape, sex and
pregnancy out of wedlock.232 Furthermore, racial and cultural homogeneity has dominated the
Korean understanding of identity, and those who connect with national outsiders were viewed
with skepticism.233 The kijich’on sex workers represent a national “shame,” reminding the rest of
Korea how weak their country is in relation to the U.S. even after the colonialism.
Moon writes that “The South Korean government’s priorities for state-building, national
security, and economic development, over any concern for the social welfare of women and/or
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the moral order of society, have determined policies regarding prostitution.”234 For example,
economic stability was prioritized over kijich’on sex workers’ rights. Even though Korea was no
longer under Japanese rule, the kijich’on sex workers felt burdened with keeping the U.S.
soldiers happy while in Korea.235 Despite the kijich’on sex workers’ hope that Korean
sovereignty was a hope and promise that they would be abused no longer, they saw that the
Korean government prioritized local business and U.S. relations over them.236 A former kijich’on
sex worker who identified herself only as “Kim” (63 years-old) claimed that in the 22 years she
had worked in the military camps since 1961, Korean government officials visited monthly to
say to the group “You are all patriots for comforting the G.I.s and earning U.S. dollars. Without
you the village virgins and ladies would all be raped. Our country will be peaceful only if you
are servicing the U.S. soldiers well.”237 The necessity of these women did not help elevate their
status or help them secure a means of supporting themselves other than sex work.

Films and Representation of Kijich’on Sex Workers
Under the myth of masculinity, women’s sexuality is restricted and controlled because
women are objectified. As discourse around comfort women illustrates, women are first
desexualized in order to be rendered “acceptable.” Kijich’on sex workers are examples of how
sexualized women are marked “unacceptable” and vilified. Even when films engage earnestly
with the issue, the clash with the myth of masculinity’s understanding of women as objects
impact the representation of kijich’on women.
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The Bacchus Lady (Dir. E J-yong 2016) was one of the economically successful domestic
films that dealt with the issue of kijich’on sex workers and the lasting impacts of prostitution.
Although the film effectively engages with class issues, its stance on the subject of sex workers
wavers towards the end of the film. Film journalist for Magazine M Na Won Jung writes that the
film begins with a distanced look at the world that exploits So-young but turns melodramatic
with the themes of old age and death; while an interesting idea with great actors, the unsolved
contradictions make the audience uncomfortable at times.238 Similarly, film journalist Kim Hyun
Min states that the film seems a bit over-simplified in positioning a woman’s tragic life in
modern Korean history as a sublime object of aesthetic pleasure.239 Despite these shortcomings,
the film consciously examines kijich’on sex work in the context of poverty.240
The Bacchus Lady begins with a 65-year-old So-young visiting a gynecologist with
gonorrhea. So-young is a former kijich’on sex worker who now works as a “Bacchus Lady,” an
elderly sex worker who walks the streets looking for clients. She carries several small bottles of
Bacchus, a caffeinated energy drink sold in Korea, and approaches potential clients with them.
At the hospital, So-young sees a young woman from the Philippines who accuses the Korean
doctor of abandoning her and their son. The gynecologist, now married with three kids in Korea,
denies knowing the young woman and calls security. So-young finds a Kopino boy chased by the
security guard and rescues him. The film later reveals that So-young had a son with an American
soldier and gave the baby up for adoption when the soldier abandoned them. As So-young
continues her life as a sex worker, she encounters one of her former clients now in a care facility
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unable to move. He begs So-young to help him die, and after some consideration she does. Two
more of her johns convince her to aid their suicide, and she gets caught by the police. Heading to
imprisonment, So-young comments that she won’t have to work for food anymore since she is
going to jail. She dies in prison and no one comes to collect her remains.
One reason why men treat So-young poorly is because she is seen as already corrupted.
She can be used in whatever way because she cannot be in a more dire situation. She has already
hit rock bottom having been someone who once “opened her legs for the Yankees” and now at
65 is still “a bitch who sells her body,” both phrases used by different characters in the film to
describe So-young. The film illustrates the double-bind that Amy Lee and Joseph Tse-Hei Lee
discuss in their article:
Once a Korean woman entered camp-town prostitution, it would be extremely difficult
for her to marry a Korean man and return to the mainstream society. The camp-town
prostitutes were called ‘foreign princesses’ (yanggongju) by Koreans, a derogatory term
implying that prostitutes were selling their bodies to advance themselves into American
materialism at the expense of Korean traditional values of chastity and virginity. The only
option would be to remain a prostitute or to become a military bride.241
Economically and sexually exploited, the label of kijich’on sex worker leaves So-young with
very few options. She “chooses” to remain a prostitute because there are few other viable ways
for her to support herself.
The men use So-young not only for her body but also for emotional release and selfish
gains. Her former client uses So-young as a witness to his suicide. Even though he can “no
longer have sex,” he invites So-young to a fancy hotel room after an extravagant dinner at a
restaurant. Expecting to service him, So-young tries to initiate but he stops her, explaining once
again that he cannot perform sexual acts. Instead, he grabs a bottle of sleeping pills and poison,
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convincing her to stay with him so that he doesn’t have to die alone. Handing her one sleeping
pill he explains that they will both go to sleep, and she will wake up in the morning whereas he
will not. Surprised and upset, So-young has no time to react as the man quickly swallows his
handful of pills and encourages So-young to take her sleeping pill. Even though he leaves her
some money (around $1000) and a letter, he ultimately does not consider So-young’s feelings or
future. So-young is eventually caught on the hotel camera and falsely accused of murdering a
client for a meager sum of $1000 which he withdrew from his bank account earlier.
A young male documentary maker follows So-young around calling her halmŏni
(grandma) and begging her to help him make his film about kijich’on women. There is a
correlation between the treatment of comfort women during the Japanese colonialism and of
kijich’on sex workers, where being respectful means obscuring the female sexuality of these
women. Even though So-young is still active as a sex worker, the documentary maker tries to
remove So-young’s sexuality as a supposed act of respect. He also steers the conversation to
emphasize So-young’s victimhood – she never wanted to be a sex worker but once she worked in
the military camps, there was no other choice for her. So-young repeatedly rejects the term
“grandmother.” She also emphasizes that she worked to support herself her whole life, and while
she agrees that there were not many choices for her after the military camp, she states that she is
not ashamed of feeding herself in a world where no one will look out for her.
So-young sees herself in the Filipino woman who is shunned by the Korean doctor who
cuts all contact with the woman once he returns to Korea. When there is a brief mention of Steve,
a young black soldier who lived with So-young and had a child in Korea decades ago, So-young
claims that she doesn’t know if he is alive or dead. Steve may have been one of the soldiers who
did not have any intention of making permanent commitments to his local “wife” during his time
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in Korea. Margo Okazawa writes that many U.S. soldiers entered “marriages” of convenience to
satisfy their needs during their stay, only to abandon it all when they have to return to their “real”
lives in America.242
The arrangement between a visiting foreigner and a local “wife” is reminiscent of the
“Madam Butterfly” narrative. The story has many different versions but the most famous
rendition is Giacomo Puccini’s 1904 opera Madama Butterfly, based on John Luther Long’s
short story Madame Butterfly (1898) that he based on Pierre Loti’s novel Madame Chrysantheme
(1887).243 In the “Madam Butterfly” narrative, a Western man weds a local woman, has a child,
and leaves her promising to return, all the while never taking the wedding ceremony seriously
because it is “foreign” to him. Believing his empty promise, the local woman rejects all other
suiters only to find that the man has married someone else from his country. In an attempt to
ensure a better future for her mixed-race child, she kills herself so that the man and his new wife
will take the baby back to their country. In this fantasy written by white men, the local woman
sees her sacrifice as necessary for her child and recognizes the new wife to be more suitable for
the man. She never blames that man for deceiving her or not honoring their own marriage.
In The Bacchus Lady, the Filipino woman believes that the Korean doctor would come
back for her and their son. The doctor impregnates and abandons the young Filipino woman just
as Steve did to So-young. Unlike the Filipino woman, So-young chose to give her baby up for
adoption to America. She says that she will go to hell for what she had done, to abandon a baby
not even 1 year old. As in the Butterfly narrative, regret and guilt is for So-young alone to bear.
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Conclusion
Exploitation of women’s labor happens at multiple levels: at one end of the spectrum are
the socially outcasted kijich’on sex workers who are labeled “bad” women but necessary for the
U.S.-Korean military alliance. On the other end of the spectrum is Park Geun-hye, the “good”
daughter of Park Chung-hee who acted as the stand-in first lady after the assassination of her
mother in 1974 until the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979. In 2012, Korea elected Park
Geun-hye as its first female president. She served as president from 2013 until she was
impeached in 2017. The emergence of the first national female leader marked a notable moment
in Korea. Jay Chang Joon Kim, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives from
California, commented that “South Korea produced a female leader before Japan, China, or even
United States could. Korea shocked the world with our development of democracy in the
political realm.”244 Claiming that no Korean woman had been a leader since the ninth century,
one journalist pointed out that “Park bec[ame] the most powerful figure in a country where many
women earn less than men and are trapped in low-paying jobs despite first-class educations.”245
The first female president sparked Korean media speculation about a future of strong and
powerful women.
Some used the example of the first female president as hard evidence that there is no
more gender discrimination in Korea. Only radical women were still “feminists” in this world
where women could achieve the most (political) power if they just tried. Media and politicians
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celebrated the female president as proof that there is equal opportunity based only on merit. But
the election of one female president masked the still-existing gender-based discrimination in
Korea.
Despite media speculation about the dawning of a new era of gender equality with the
inauguration of Park Geun-hye, the fact remains that Park’s image is still closer to a good
daughter to her father than an independent woman. In Korea, daughters typically live with their
parents until they get married. After marriage, they become a member of her husband’s family,
as well as a crucial part of her own nuclear family as a wife and mother. There is a popular idiom
that states “a married daughter is no better than a stranger.” Park is not simply a female politician
but the daughter of the famous leader who has a past of serving the said father well through her
supportive role.
Park Guen-hye’s political career is a real-life example of the impact of the myth of
masculinity in Korea. It is important to note Park Geun-hye’s support of her father’s regime
which created policies that further objectified women for the economic and military security of
the nation. Returning from a study program in France, Park Geun-hye worked as a stand-in first
lady to her father in 1974. Still in her early 20s, unmarried, and desexualized, Park Geun-hye did
not challenge her father’s masculinity. Instead, she served as a good supportive daughter to her
father, doing her duties for the nation as an image of obedience and subservience.
Park Geun-hye continued to employ the image of a “good” daughter/woman in her own
political campaign that culminated in the presidential election of 2012. Her background as the
“good” daughter of Park Chung-hee with conservative values and the ongoing image of an
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unmarried daughter serving the country was appealing to a large portion of her supporter base.246
Although Park Geun-hye’s gender was highly emphasized when the media described her as the
“first female president,” Park’s family history and her role as a “good” daughter became a crucial
part of her narrative. Closely following the election, different media mentioned the connection
between Park Geun-hye’s status as an unmarried woman and her dedication to remaining a
“good” daughter to her father: “She has created an image as a selfless daughter of Korea, never
married, then a successful female lawmaker in a male-dominated political world.”247
The myth of masculinity renders women as valuable only in relation to the male, as can
be seen in film and Park’s impeachment and imprisonment. This focus on male subjectivity is
often shared in post-colonial nations:
A post-colonial nation has a particularly ambivalent relationship with its history,
simultaneously accepting and negating it, so has the symbolic location of women in the
nation. Women are therefore seen as an embodiment of the shameful national history
which has to be negated or forgotten or of the past to which the nation should return,
invoking nostalgia without history or memory of the precolonial. […] While women
symbolically represent the nation's past and future as ideological boundary markers,
emblems of the nation and signifiers of national difference, they are also recruited by
nationalist leaders to serve in militant anti-colonial movements and wars, as cheap
laborers, warriors, and faithful wives and/or mothers. And, despite their multiple roles,
women are often excluded from the rights of enfranchised citizenship, retaining an
"object" rather than a "subject" position in the nation.248
Subjective experiences of women are necessary to reclaim female subjectivity in opposition to
the masculine understanding of female sexuality. However, with media forms, most specifically
through film, the recounting of experiences becomes more difficult. Film is not a simple
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narrative but an amalgamation of plot, culture, politics, and unseen biases. Even when women
are represented on screen, it does not mean the film provides a space for subjective recounting.
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Epilogue

The outcome of 2012 election heavily influenced the media. For the film industry, there
were two notable responses immediately following the 2012 election. Between 2012 and 2017,
more female directors produced works featuring strong female subjects that defied masculine
understanding of femininity. Rather than playing the role of a dutiful wife, girlfriend, or daughter
in need of protection, the characters in these films refuse traditional roles within the family and
prove to be psychologically stronger than the male main characters.
Another trend was masculine narrative that returned to the original trauma of domination.
The history of domination triggers the national myth of masculinity—Korea must be masculine
to overcome the Japanese Other. These films portray Japanese domination from the male
subjective experience to show masculine resistance against the Japanese, often through violence.
In these films, the masculine male is celebrated for defeating the greater evil, the Japanese Other.
As the country celebrates a “new” and different era of gender equality with the first female
president, these films re-establish the need for the myth of masculinity that necessarily focuses
on a masculine self.
The first group of films incorporates a focus on female desire that is seemingly separate
from the patriarch. This shift of focus does not necessarily mean that women act as main
characters; on the contrary, many films feature male main character to emphasize the gap
between what a man expects from a woman under the myth of masculinity and how female
subjectivity defies such expectations. Both Helpless (Dir. Byeon Young-joo, 2012) and
Bluebeard (Dir. Lee Su-yeon, 2017) present male main characters that construct their own
understandings of the world under the influence of the myth of masculinity. These male
characters assume that their female counterparts share their desires, conform to traditional
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familial roles, and need protection. However, the female characters are given their own voices by
the directors to have their own desires and motivations, and they prove to be much stronger than
their male counterparts.
Helpless (2012) is a film that shows how female desire can be limitless and untethered to
the masculine and their understanding of femininity as necessarily weak and in need of
protection. Helpless begins with Moon-ho (Sun-Kyun Lee) and Seon-yeong (Min-hee Kim) in a
car on the way to see Moon-ho’s parents in Andong. Andong is 119 miles southeast of Seoul,
and the capital of Gyeongsang Province. Andong is known for its conservatism and a history of
producing many Confucian scholars. The fact that Moon-ho’s parents reside in Andong signals
to the viewers who know the history of Andong that Seon-yeong is expected to abide by strict
and traditional gender roles.
Yet, the film starts subverting both Moon-ho’s and the audience’s expectations from the
beginning. Seon-yeong disappears from the expressway rest area on the way to Moon-ho’s
parents’ house. Moon-ho immediately assumes kidnapping because he cannot believe that Seonyeong would disappear of her free will, especially when getting his parents’ approval is so
important for their upcoming wedding. But as he investigates, he realizes that Seon-yeong has
murdered a woman in the past and assumed her identity to escape from her father’s debt. Moonho realizes that he does not know anything about the woman he was going to marry, including
her name. When he gets a phone call from Seon-yeong, he coaxes her to tell him everything,
saying that he will help her. When she does not speak, he yells at her, “Who are you?” The Seonyeong that exists beyond his help is a stranger, an unknown, a threat. About to be exposed for
who she really is, she abandons the persona of Seon-yeong and all that Moon-ho promises her
such as a family and stability, and tries to murder another woman to steal her identity. Seon-
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yeong’s utmost desire is to be happy by detaching herself from her father and her old life—she
might love Moon-ho, but her desire for her own happiness means that she can abandon Moon-ho
at any moment if he gets in the way.
This film shows a potential female subjectivity that has its own experiences and
motivations. Seon-yeong murders a woman not out of spite but because she wants to be happy.
The murder is calculated and impersonal. There is no inherent “female sentiment.” Moon-ho sees
her as needing protection, but she does not depend on her fiancé or any other man in the past or
in the present. She is responsible for herself, capable of defending herself, and looking for her
own happiness. While I’m not arguing that Helpless is directly related to the 2012 election, I
believe that it imagines a new possibility for a female subjectivity that is envisioned outside the
masculine understanding of women as objects. These new-found subjective women defy male
understanding of women based on the myth of masculinity—an understanding that treats women
as needing protection from men and exist only within social family units. In the film, Seonyeong simply refuses to be the victim that her father and the debt-collectors assign her.
Director Byeon Young-joo is known for her focus on the intersectionality between gender
and race/ethnicity. Helpless is loosely based on a novel All She was Worth by a Japanese author
Miyabe Miyuki. In the original novel the fiancé gives up looking for the woman, and it is the
detective cousin that finds the missing woman in the end. One of the main focuses in the original
novel is the credit-based economy in Japan and how it impacts young people. While the original
novel emphasizes individual credit card usage, Byeon shifts the focus to family influence on a
young woman. In the film, Seon-yeong’s father’s debt is the main source of conflict and the
motivation for Seon-yeong to abandon her own identity.
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In Helpless the male character is left baffled at the recognition that he (or her love for
him) is not the most important motivator. The film Bluebeard (Dir. Lee Su-yeon, 2017) features
a male character who cannot cope with reality and instead recreates his world through a
masculine understanding of femininity. The film begins with a young doctor Seung-hoon (JinWoong Cho) struggling to adapt to his new life in a small city. The new city contrasts Seunghoon’s life in Gangnam District in Seoul—Gangnam is one of the most rich and popular areas in
Seoul. The new hospital he works at is much smaller and his house is on the second floor of an
old-fashioned butcher shop, which is run by his landlord. One night, Seung-hoon finds a
woman’s head in a plastic bag in the butcher shop and panicked Seung-hoon steals the head and
puts in his own freezer. When his wife goes missing shortly after visiting him, he suspects the
landlord and works together with a retired detective to find more evidence. In the end it is
revealed that Seung-hoon is the one who murdered a woman and kept her head in the freezer,
and that he had been an unreliable narrator. The audiences see various scenes that have
previously been represented through Seung-hoon’s eyes, and it becomes clear that Seung-hoon
had been recreating himself as a stronger man than he really was.
Addicted to propofol used during endoscopy and suffering from hallucinations and guilt,
Seung-hoon concocts a new story to invent a masculine self that is not addicted to drugs, coping
with the stress of his failed business, and not physically tormented by loan sharks. Unable to
cope with the fact that his wife left him because of his drug habits, Seung-hoon reimagines his
wife to be mentally unstable—her instability caused him to leave her instead. When beaten by
loan sharks who find him in the new city, he imagines his landlord’s biracial son beaten up by
school bullies instead. It is easier for Seung-hoon to imagine other people around him as weak
than to acknowledge his own weakness.
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It is important to note that I am not arguing that all female directors’ works successfully
or even consciously promote female subjectivity. In films that focus on women’s desires within a
family structure, it is often still difficult to distinguish between an individual desire and a desire
that has been created by the patriarchal family structure. However, it is a start to see some cracks
in the clear-cut understanding of women as weak and sharing men’s desires in the masculine
rendering of the world.
When faced with the incomprehensible female leader, some male directors returned to the
original national trauma of Japanese domination to re-envision the male-centered experience of
the trauma. The Tiger: An Old Hunter’s Tale (Dir. Park Hoon-jung, 2015) is an example of male
subjectivity and successful resistance against the Japanese Other. The return to the original
trauma shows the emphasis on the need for the myth of the masculine to persist. By reimagining
the Japanese Other, a common enemy for all Koreans, the masculine can once again safely
assume the position of the protector of his family, including the women.
The Tiger: an Old Hunter’s Tale is set in 1925 Japanese-occupied Korea. In the Japanese
ministry filled with various stuffed animals including several tigers sits the Japanese minister. He
wants the last Korean tiger, Mountain Lord, that lives in Mountain Jiri and had banned all nonauthorized hunting of tigers. Unsatisfied with the progress, he reprimands his second-incommand. The second-in-command, a native Korean who believes himself to be Japanese and
therefore superior, is eager to prove his loyalty to the army. He hires a team of Korean tiger
hunters and they manage to catch Mountain Lord’s wife and cub. The team tries to lure
Mountain Lord using his cub’s body but the tiger proves to be smarter. The team leader visits the
best hunter, the main character who has given up hunting after shooting his wife by accident not
long after the first scene, but he refuses to get involved working for the Japanese ministry. When
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his only son, sixteen-year-old boy who followed the hunting team in curiosity, dies from
Mountain Lord’s attack, the hunter goes on his own hunt for Mountain Lord. The hunter and the
hunting group backed up by Japanese soldiers separately chase the tiger—the hunter for revenge,
the team to get favorable treatment from the Japanese ministry. The hunter mortally wounds the
tiger and purposefully lures him to the edge of the cliff. The two fall off a cliff so that their
bodies will not be found by the Japanese, and Mountain Lord will not be another stuffed Korean
tiger in the ministry.
In this film, Japan functions as an evil force that seeps into the Korean characters to a
different degree while Mountain Lord represents the purest Korean spirit. The second-incommand is almost drenched in evil; he rejects his Korean “origin” and thinks he is superior to
other Koreans because he is more Japanese than them. He not only earns his living off of the
Japanese but feels pride in becoming one of them. Then, there is the hunting team. They are not
openly supportive of the Japanese, yet they comply because they make their living off of the
Japanese. Ultimately the team supports the Japanese soldiers ruin Mountain Jiri in an attempt to
capture Mountain Lord. The team leader is willing to sell off Mountain Lord, the purest form of
Korean spirit and the king of the mountain, to the Japanese minister to be stuffed and displayed
as the last Korean tiger conquered.
The main character is not actively helping the Japanese or earning his living through
them. He finds things from the mountain to sell. He has some respect for the tiger and refuses to
help the Japanese capture Mountain Lord. But that is the extent of his resistance. He tells his son
that he is not an independence activist, and therefore his son has nothing to worry about. The
Japanese minister mentions fierce Korean rebels hiding in Mountain Jiri who cut up Japanese
soldiers into pieces, and the main character is much more passive compared to them.
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Mountain Lord, the last Korean tiger in Mountain Jiri that is coveted by the Japanese
minister, represents the purest form of Korean resistance to the evil of the Japanese.
Symbolically, tigers are the national animal of Korea. From the beginning, the Japanese minister
is discussing his desire to eradicate Korean tigers, killing them and displaying them at the
Japanese ministry immobile, helpless, and contained. One man comments that without Mountain
Lord, wolves and boars will take over the mountain—the wolves and boars symbolize the
Japanese. The tiger is a necessary force to obtain peace in the mountains, just as masculinity and
violence is necessary to face the Japanese intruders.
The main character kills Mountain Lord’s mom and his own wife. Mountain Lord
becomes more fierce as a result, and the hunter gives up hunting. He resumes hunting when (1)
Mountain Lord kills his only son and (2) the Japanese soldiers flood the area to capture Mountain
Lord. The main character is necessarily violent—to almost protect the Korean spirit (both the
tiger and himself, or his hunting skills) from going into the hands of the Japanese. He hunts only
when the Japanese soldiers set up dynamites to destroy the entire forest and try to get rid of all
the places the Mountain Lord can hide. Both the main character and the Mountain Lord gets their
families killed. The main character shoots his own wife while chasing Mountain Lord, and the
hunting team kills Mountain Lord’s wife and son. The team leader tries to lure Mountain Lord
with his own son, just as he later tries to lure the main character by recruiting Seok to the hunting
team. None of the men’s families get any choice—Seok and his mom are assumed to follow the
main character’s feelings towards the Japanese. When Seok betrays that and joins the hunting
team, he is punished.
Purposefully excluded from these narratives are women’s experience of the trauma. In
the wake of liberation, women’s experience of Japanese colonialism, especially that of comfort
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women, was strictly regulated. The films that newly imagine Japanese colonialism return the
emphasis to male subjectivity in response to the male Other, leaving no room for female
subjectivity.
One last film I would like to mention as possibly exposing the harms perpetrated by the
myth of masculinity in Korean film industry is The Pregnant Tree and the Goblin (Dir. DongRyung Kim, Gyeong-tae Park, 2019). The film, half-fantasy and half-documentary, initially
released at 45 Seoul Independent Film Festival in 2019. The two directors and the main actor
each received Executive Special Awards.249 The film subsequently released in a handful of
theaters in Seoul starting on January 27, 2022. Unfortunately, I have no direct access to the film
that is only available on Korean streaming websites that limit services to domestic viewers. A
film critic HyeYoung Cho writes a brief summary of the film:
The main character, In-sun Park, is a former kijich’on sex worker. Her story had been
told and retold by media and scholars according to their own readings and understanding
of the situation. This film helps Park tell her own story through her own methods and
genre. Park’s life had been out of her control, but she is determined to choose her own
death. For former kijich’on sex workers, even their deaths had often become a mere
spectacle. Park faces the messengers of death with an iron will to dictate on her own
terms. […] [At the end of the film] facing death, Park laughs. The laugh is neither loud
nor silent. It is unclear who is laughing or where the laughter is coming from. […] The
laughter is the anger of the minority against the authority and the system.250
The film discusses the formerly silenced topic of kijich’on sex workers, and it is providing some
space for the former sex worker, In-sun Park, to express some of her emotions. I am not under
the illusion that Park had full control of the narrative of the film. However, I do believe that the
directors are more aware of representing Park’s story because they work with her and her
subjective experiences rather than employing a stereotype or media image. Park had been one of
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the three women in the two directors’ 2012 documentary Tour of Duty, in which two former
kijich’on sex workers and a biracial woman living in military camptown were featured. Park’s
return to the 2019 film suggests to me that the directors were responsive in the retelling of her
story. Perhaps with more films and film directors that question the myth of masculinity and its
understanding and portrayal of women, more discussions will open up about the problems of
incorporating a sense of justified male violence as a national identity.
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